Sentencing; Proportionality; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Waiting “until the morning of sentencing to file a hastily prepared sentencing memorandum”; Failure to seek an adjournment

The court held that given “the severe and brutal circumstances underlying the murder, as well as defendant’s role as the leader in its commission, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing” him to 40 to 60 years for felony murder. Also, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant generally argued that his sentence was disproportionate, and reflected the trial court’s unsupported reasoning considering its recognition of his youth and other mitigating factors. However, the trial court’s reasoning on the record adequately supported that his sentence fell “within the range of principled outcomes.” The trial court noted his “youth as well as its doubts that, given his age, he could have properly interacted with police.” The trial court also appeared “to have accepted as true defendant’s later-introduced claims of childhood abuse, and considered [his] good behavior while incarcerated, which the trial court considered as mitigating factors.” But it “also properly considered several negative factors that supported its ultimate sentence.” It considered the aggravating circumstances. “For instance, defendant, after shooting the pregnant victim twice, left her in a secluded area where she was not discovered until the following day; she died three days later. The trial court believed there was ‘no excuse or justification for that whatsoever.’” It also “noted that defendant was the leader in this situation, reasoning that” it was his decision and idea, and he was the one who executed the victim. Affirmed.