Child sexually abusive activity (CSAA) charge; Entrapment; People v Johnson; Inducement; Law enforcement use of untargeted reverse sting operations; People v Butler; People v Williams; Principle that merely presenting an opportunity to commit a crime is not entrapment; Government escalation & deception; Distinguishing People v Killian; Intent; How a “normally law-abiding person would react in similar circumstances”; People v Juillet; Reprehensible police conduct; People v Fabiano

Holding that defendant was not entrapped, the court affirmed his plea-based conviction of CSAA. He was also charged with using a computer to commit a crime, and accosting a child for immoral purposes, after he was arrested for soliciting a minor in a sex sting. He moved to dismiss the charges on the ground of entrapment. The trial court denied his motion, finding the police merely provided the opportunity for him “to commit criminal acts involving arranging to meet a 15-year-old minor for paid sexual activity and defendant willingly seized that opportunity.” On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his conviction should be vacated because he was entrapped. Law enforcement “merely presented defendant with the opportunity to commit the crime of which he was convicted. Law enforcement posed as a 15-year-old who was offering sexual acts in exchange for money, posted an advertisement on an adult-oriented website, and initially claimed to be old enough to post on the site. After defendant responded to the advertisement, [he] was clearly informed that the decoy was actually 15 years old.” Thus, he “was presented with an opportunity to either proceed with committing the relevant criminal acts or decline. Merely presenting an opportunity to commit a crime is not entrapment.” In addition, unlike in “Killian, law enforcement did not have any information about defendant before conducting the undercover operation.” The operation here was “more analogous to the undercover operations in Butler and Williams, where something illegal was made available for those seeking it to contact the undercover officer and offer to purchase it.” That was “precisely what occurred in this case. Moreover, government escalation of the defendant’s criminal culpability is only one factor and is not itself dispositive on the issue of entrapment. To the extent defendant argues that he was deceived, that fact by itself also does not establish entrapment.” Further, the trial court “did not err in its application of the legal framework for discerning whether entrapment occurred under the inducement prong of the test.” Finally, simply “presenting the opportunity to commit criminal acts in an untargeted fashion is not reprehensible conduct constituting entrapment.”