Criminal contempt for violating a personal protection order (PPO); ARM v KJL; Standard of proof; Notice that the proceeding was criminal in nature; Sufficiency of the evidence
The court held that (1) the trial court applied the correct standard of proof, (2) defendant had sufficient notice it was a criminal proceeding, and (3) there was sufficient evidence he violated the PPO. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s decision finding him in criminal contempt for violating the PPO. “Petitioner and respondent were previously involved in a relationship.” Petitioner obtained an ex parte PPO prohibiting respondent from contacting petitioner by phone “or ‘posting a message through the use of any medium of communication, including the Internet or a computer or any electronic medium.’ The PPO informed respondent that a violation would subject him to various potential penalties, including ‘immediate arrest’ and the ‘civil and criminal contempt powers of the court.’” He was accused of violating the PPO after, at about 2 a.m. “petitioner received a Snapchat message from respondent, which stated, ‘Morning [kiss face emoji] stop by sometime before this gets much more out of control.’” Respondent first asserted “the trial court applied an incorrect preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof.” But the court noted the trial court “indisputably and correctly made its finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the prosecutor mistakenly referred to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in closing argument, the trial court explicitly stated that it found that the evidence showed ‘at a level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt which is the standard of proof in a case of this matter.’” And its written order indicated it “found respondent guilty of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court also rejected his argument that it should reverse his “conviction on procedural grounds because the prosecutor thought that the case was a civil matter.” In addition to the warnings in the PPO, during the continued hearing on his motion to terminate it, held before the violation hearing, the trial court informed him “he had been accused of a ‘criminal violation,’ and the violation could result in up to 93 days of incarceration.” Finally, as to the sufficiency of the evidence, the “parties’ past relationship and communications through Snapchat, the content and timing of the message, and petitioner’s testimony that the message appeared as a continuation of earlier messages between them support the trial court’s findings.”
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