Judicial review of an administrative ruling; The substantial-evidence test; Lawrence v Michigan Unemployment Ins Agency; Credibility of witnesses; Michigan Employment Relations Comm’n v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc; Michigan Occupational Safety & Health Administration (MIOSHA); Administrative Law Judge (ALJ); Board of Health & Safety Compliance & Appeals (the Board)

Noting that its holding was limited to whether the trial court applied the correct legal principles and substantial-evidence test to its review of the ALJ’s decision, after reviewing the record, the court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in its findings. Respondent-MIOSHA issued a citation to petitioner for failing to train an employee (S) who died while operating a “bobcat”/skid steer. The ALJ vacated the citation, but the Board reinstated it. The trial court then reversed the Board’s decision. On appeal, the court found the trial court did not reversibly err. First, it was appropriate for the trial court “to consider that the ALJ was in the better position to judge the credibility of witnesses.” In addition, the trial court “specifically acknowledged its limited review, finding that the record did ‘not contain competent, material, and substantial evidence to support the Board’s view regarding the facts,’ and that a reasonable fact-finder could not find that” respondent’s investigator’s “testimony ‘was sufficient to support the conclusion that [S] did not receive adequate training.’” The trial court “properly reviewed the whole record, including the ALJ’s credibility determinations, to determine whether there was ‘competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record’ to support the Board’s decision.” Further, although a few comments by the trial court “could, when read in isolation, suggest a weighing of evidence, our review of [its] analysis as a whole confirms that it did not do so.” Finally, the trial court “found that there was not competent, material, and substantial evidence to support the Board’s inference that petitioner’s failure to document [S’s] training means [it] failed to show that training occurred.” And respondent did not point “to a requirement for such training to be documented.” Affirmed.