Wrongful termination under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); MCL 15.362; Shallal v Catholic Soc Servs of Wayne Cnty; Protected activity; Henry v Detroit; “Public body”; MCL 15.361(d)(iii); Causal connection; Shaw v City of Ecorse; Legitimate non-discriminatory reason; Debano-Griffin v Lake Cnty Bd of Comm’rs; Pretext; The 90-day limitations period governing WPA actions; MCL 15.363(1); Judicial disqualification; MCR 2.003(B) & (C)(1)

The court held that (1) plaintiff-former firefighter established a genuine issue of material fact that he was both engaged in a protected activity and that defendant-township terminated him because of that activity, (2) his claim was not time-barred, and (3) he was not entitled to remand before a different judge. Plaintiff sued defendant for wrongful termination in violation of the WPA after he “reported various concerns to township leaders about problems within the fire department, the most serious of which involved the legitimacy of certain payments” the fire chief (R) made to his sons, who also worked for the fire department. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant. On appeal, the court agreed with plaintiff that there remained genuine issues of material fact that he engaged in protected activity and that his protected activity caused his termination. It found “the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of the WPA. Contrary to the trial court’s stated reasoning, the evidence presented showed that [plaintiff] reported a suspected violation of law to a public body.” And because there was evidence supporting his “assertion that he reported the possible misappropriation of township funds, he was engaged in a protected activity under the WPA.” Because he “established that he was engaged in a protected activity and that there was a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination, the trial court legally erred by holding that he failed to establish a prima facie case under the WPA.” Further, the evidence “established a genuine issue of material fact that Chief [R’s] assertions about the reasons for his recommendation that [plaintiff] be terminated were mere pretext and that he was motivated to fire [him] because he reported his suspicious financial activity.” The court next rejected defendant’s claim that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred. Defendant officially terminated plaintiff at the 12/17/20 “fire board meeting, and he received a corresponding termination letter on” 12/20/20. As such, “he was required to file his action within 90 days of” 12/17/20. Given that “he filed his initial complaint on” 2/26/21, it was timely filed. The court disagreed with defendant’s assertion that R actually terminated plaintiff by text message on 10/9/20, “or that the text was at least a threat of termination that would constitute a violation of the WPA.” Finally, the court found plaintiff was not entitled to remand before a different judge, noting he could not establish a ground for judicial disqualification. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.