Sufficiency of the evidence; Second-degree murder; Malice; People v Goecke; Tampering with evidence; Jury instructions; Accident instruction; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; Expert testimony; MRE 702; Sentencing; Scoring of PRV 7

The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s second-degree murder and tampering with evidence convictions, and that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence or instructing the jury. He was also convicted of OWI causing death. His convictions arose out of a fatal vehicle collision. The trial court sentenced him to 25 to 35 years for second-degree murder, 10 to 15 for OWI causing death, and 7 to 10 for tampering with evidence. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that there was insufficient evidence of malice to support the second-degree murder conviction. It concluded “a rational trier of fact could have found [he] ‘intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm,’ when he inhaled Surf Onn and proceeded to drive erratically while intoxicated.” In addition, because the evidence showed he decided to drive while intoxicated, the trial court did not err by denying his request to instruct the jury regarding accident. The court also rejected his claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the tampering with evidence conviction, noting “a rational trier of fact could have found that [he] knew that these items could establish that he was driving while intoxicated and that he threw them out of the passenger compartment of his vehicle to conceal them from discovery by the first responders.” The court further rejected his contention that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to admit other acts evidence and allowing an expert witness to testify outside of his training and experience. “The probative value of defendant’s prior purchases of Surf Onn, along with the trial court’s limiting instruction, ‘did not stir the jurors to such passion . . . as to [be swept] beyond rational consideration of [the defendant’s] guilt or innocence of the crime on trial.’” As such, it “did not abuse its discretion by allowing the admission of testimony and evidence about defendant’s prior purchases of the inhalant.” Moreover, the expert’s “testimony was very narrow, limited to the general effects of a central nervous system stimulant. [And] defense counsel’s cross-examination elicited [the expert’s] admission that he did not know the effects of the cocaine on defendant or knowledge of the effect of the amount of cocaine for which defendant tested positive.” Finally, given its determination that there was sufficient evidence to support his evidence tampering conviction, it found meritless his argument that the trial court erred by assessing 20 points for PRV 7. Affirmed.