Motion to file a second amended complaint; MCR 2.118(A)(2); Futility; Adding parties; Prejudice; Whether an ordinance was a regulatory ordinance rather than a zoning ordinance; Natural Aggregates Corp v Brighton Twp; Procedural due process; Property right; Whether consideration of an application was arbitrary & capricious; Claim an ordinance was void because it conflicted with the Michigan Regulation & Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA); MCL 333.27959(4); Yellow Tail Ventures, Inc v City of Berkley; “Competitive process”

In these consolidated appeals, the court held that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions to file amended complaints, (2) the ordinance at issue was regulatory, not zoning, (3) defendant-city did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in scoring plaintiff-1864’s license application, and (4) the city’s ordinance did not conflict with the MRTMA. The case related to the issuance of licenses for marijuana retailers, provisioning centers, and designated consumption establishments in the city. In one of these appeals, plaintiff-BRT argued the trial court abused its discretion in denying BRT’s motion to file a second amended complaint. The court was inclined to agree the “proposed amended complaint would not be ‘futile.’” But it found no abuse of discretion “for two reasons. First, the amended complaint would have added parties to this litigation. Thus, this litigation would not merely have expanded the legal issues already pending, the matter would have expanded the parties involved in” it. Second, while the trial court did not expressly discuss it, “several of the intervenors would have been unduly prejudiced if the amended complaints were allowed to be filed.” In another appeal, intervenor-Trucenta argued the trial court erred in granting “summary disposition because the ordinance at issue is a regulatory ordinance, not a zoning ordinance.” The court disagreed. Apart from an ordinance specifically stating that the provisions of the article were “‘regulatory in nature and not intended to be interpreted as zoning laws[,]’” the city’s zoning ordinances were found in Chapter 52. Further, nearly all “the provisions of the ordinance at issue concern the operation of marijuana facilities, not where those facilities must operate.” The court could not “identify a particular provision in the ordinance that expressly limits where a marijuana facility may, or may not, operate within the municipality. Such provisions are separately found in Chapter 52.” It concluded that, on balance, the ordinance was regulatory rather than zoning. In another appeal, 1864 also argued the trial court erred in granting summary disposition. The court rejected its claim that it had a property interest in having its application properly scored. Further, it determined the plain language of the ordinance supported the city’s decision not to “award 10 points to 1864’s application for a structure exceeding 2,000 square feet.” Affirmed.