Constitutional right of confrontation; A trial witness’s testimony introducing the substance of an out-of-court statement by an unavailable witness; Whether there is a chain of custody exception to the Confrontation Clause; Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts; Distinguishing People v Chambers; Corpus delicti rule

The court held “that a defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation may be violated when a trial witness’s testimony introduces the substance of an out-of-court, testimonial statement by an unavailable witness.” It concluded that the statement at issue “was admitted in violation of defendant’s right of confrontation. However, because the Court of Appeals erred by applying the corpus delicti rule to [his] statements,” the court remanded to the Court of Appeals “to determine whether the violation of defendant’s right to confrontation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when considering [his] own statements.” In this case, he “drove across the border from Michigan into Canada without paying the toll.” A Canadian customs agent, Officer L, “arrested defendant and brought him back to the American side of the bridge.” An American customs agent, Officer S, took custody of defendant and a bulletproof vest. Defendant was charged with being a violent FIP of body armor. Before trial, the Canadian government indicated that Officer L would not be allowed to testify. Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the bulletproof vest. The court found that a violation occurred because Officer S’s testimony clearly implied that Officer L “made a testimonial statement asserting that defendant possessed a bulletproof vest. That testimony, therefore, was erroneously admitted. The corpus delicti rule, however, does not apply to defendant’s admissions that he possessed the bulletproof vest.” Next, the prosecution argued in the alternative that, even though Officer L’s “statement was testimonial, it does not implicate the Confrontation Clause because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., to prove that defendant actually possessed the bulletproof vest.” Instead, the prosecution argued “that the statement was offered only to establish the chain of custody for the vest.” But the prosecution did “not point to a single case establishing the rule that a statement used to support the chain of custody is an exception to the Confrontation Clause, and we have found none.” The court held that regardless “of whether the statement was offered merely to establish the chain of custody or to establish that defendant possessed the bulletproof vest as an element of the charged offense, the statement would need to be offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that [he] actually possessed the bulletproof vest.” The prosecution also argued that Officer S’s testimony as to his communications with Officer L “was offered only to explain how defendant and his property came into” Officer S’s custody. The court found that Chambers did not apply. It also held that a clear and logical inference from Officer S’s testimony was that “during their ‘communications,’ Officer [L] made an out-of-court statement regarding his belief that defendant possessed the body armor.” That statement was testimonial. Thus, the court affirmed “the Court of Appeals holding that defendant’s right to confront his accuser,” Officer L, was violated.

Justice Welch fully agreed with the Court’s opinion. She wrote separately because she questioned “if, in a case such as this where defendant is charged with a crime that is linked to his status as a felon and defendant stipulated to that status, defendant’s statements should be admissible without the prosecution first offering independent evidence of the corpus delicti.” While she believed “this is an important question, we have not been asked to overrule our precedent.” She thus agreed “that because defendant did not admit in his statements that he was a violent felon, his statements were not a confession. As a result, the corpus delicti did not need to first be established with independent evidence prior to the admission of the statements.”