Shaken baby syndrome (SBS) case; Motion for relief from judgment based on newly-discovered evidence; MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b); Expert testimony; MRE 702; Reliability; Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc; Relevance; Biomechanical evidence in SBS cases; State v Nieves (NJ App); Distinguishing General Elec Co v Joiner; Whether defendant established “good cause” & “actual prejudice”; MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) & (b); People v Cress; Whether the newly-discovered evidence makes a different result probable on retrial; Medical examiner (ME)

The court held that (1) “the trial court abused its discretion by deeming defendant’s proposed expert testimony inadmissible” and (2) she overcame “the procedural threshold of MCR 6.502(G) and established ‘good cause’ and ‘actual prejudice’ as required by MCR 6.508(D)(3) by demonstrating all four factors of Cress[.]” Thus, it reversed and remanded for a new trial. Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder after being accused of shaking her baby to death. She later filed a successive motion for relief from judgment, arguing that new evidence undermined the prosecution’s theory that the child’s cause of death was SBS. The trial court found her proposed expert testimony was inadmissible and denied relief. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed on the basis that “there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome on retrial even if the improperly excluded evidence was admitted.” The court disagreed, finding the trial court abused its discretion and that, “[i]f this expert testimony were presented at a retrial, . . . a different result would be probable.” First, although it did “not state a bright-line rule permitting biomechanical evidence in all SBS cases, in this case, ‘[a]lthough clearly not universally accepted,’ [the expert’s] ‘opinion is certainly “objective, rational, and based on sound and trustworthy scientific literature.”’” In addition, it “‘fit’ the facts in dispute in this case and would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the prosecution could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” the child’s cause of death was SBS. Second, “in light of the conclusion that most of defendant’s proffered expert testimony would be admissible and because all evidence that would be presented at a new trial must be considered when deciding whether new evidence would make a different result probable,” defendant satisfied all four prongs of Cress. The former ME who testified at her “trial for the prosecution, testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had changed his mind about” the child’s diagnosis. “[D]efendant has presented enough evidence to demonstrate that a different result on retrial is ‘probable.’ . . . That is, not that the chance of acquittal is a mere possibility, but instead, there is a reasonably probable likelihood that a jury would have a reasonable doubt as to” her guilt. As such, she was “entitled to a new trial.”

Dissenting, Justice Zahra, joined by Justice Viviano, found the “trial court’s refusal to vacate defendant’s conviction based on the extraordinarily weak evidence presented below [did] not even approach an abuse of the trial court’s wide discretion.” To the contrary, its “diligence, attention to detail, and thoughtful consideration . . . should be lauded as an exemplary display of how a trial court should function. Given the significant burden placed on defendant to obtain appellate reversal of her convictions, this Court’s decision is no less than a miscarriage of justice.”