Scope of forfeiture under Michigan’s Controlled Substances Act; Whether defendant-vehicle was subject to forfeiture under the terms of MCL 333.7521(1)(d); Transportation & purpose; “Transport”

The court concluded “that MCL 333.7521(1)(d) requires that a vehicle be used or intended to be used for the transportation of materials specified within the statute for the purpose of their sale or receipt before a forfeiture may be effected.” Because it found “that the facts presented here, even considered in a light most favorable to plaintiff, do not support an inference that the defendant vehicle was used or intended to be used to transport illicit materials for their sale or receipt,” the court held that claimant’s vehicle was not subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(d). Thus, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of claimant. The court concluded “that not all of the elements of MCL 333.7521(1)(d) were fulfilled concurrently.” The testimony of Sergeant R was that claimant drove her passenger, Smith, “to a known 'drug house' on [L] Street where Smith intended to purchase and did purchase heroin, then claimant drove away with Smith and the heroin in the defendant vehicle, which was pulled over by [R] shortly thereafter.” The court held that a “reasonable fact-finder might credit this narrative and conclude that claimant did indeed drive Smith in the defendant vehicle to the [L] Street address to buy drugs, fulfilling the conveyance, use, and property elements of MCL 333.7521(1)(d), but there is no reasonable suggestion that the defendant vehicle was being used to transport or facilitate the transportation of drugs at that time.” Also, a “reasonable fact-finder might also accept that Smith bought drugs via a hand-to-hand transaction while seated in the defendant vehicle, but this transaction cannot reasonably be said to involve transportation. Notwithstanding the apparent absence of drugs in the defendant vehicle, a reasonable fact-finder could even conclude that claimant’s vehicle transported drugs down the road some distance before being pulled over.” However, the court concluded that this transportation could not “be said to have been for the purpose of sale or receipt of the drugs. The only intended sale in plaintiff’s theory of the case was concluded in front of the house on [L] Street, when Smith received the drugs before claimant drove away. Because the evidence presented demonstrated that the drugs were for Smith’s personal use, there could be no further purpose of sale or receipt.”

Dissenting, Justice Viviano questioned whether the majority’s narrow interpretation of the word “receipt” in MCL 333.7521(1)(d) was correct. He “would not resolve the difficult interpretive issues presented under Subsection (1)(d), however, because claimant’s vehicle was clearly subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(f).” As a result, he would affirm the Court of Appeals on other grounds.