Scope of a custody order; Parenting time restrictions; Motion for judicial disqualification; MCR 2.003(D)(2); Evidence; Gender discrimination; Consideration of a parent’s mental health in deciding custody issues; Accusations against a child’s guardian & the guardian ad litem (GAL); Consideration of a psychological evaluation

Holding among other things that the trial court did not err in relying on a doctor’s (S) psychological evaluation in restricting petitioner-father to supervised parenting time with his child (AE), the court affirmed the probate court’s order denying his various motions. AE was placed with his paternal grandmother, who was granted a full guardianship without objection by either parent. At issue here was the denial of petitioner’s motions to disqualify the trial court judge, to remove the child’s GAL, “to compel discovery, to suppress evidence, to reinstate parenting time, and his ‘petition regarding legal violations.’” As an initial matter, the court took issue with his “repeated characterizations of the results below as ‘terminating’ his parental rights, ending the ‘parent-child relationship’ generally, or ending his parenting time with AE in particular.” The trial court did not terminate his parental rights or his right to parenting time – it “merely restricted [him] to supervised parenting time in the child’s local area with no overnights, then to supervised telephonic contact, pending father’s engaging in, and benefiting from, mental-health treatment.” As to his motion to disqualify, the court did not need to consider his substantive arguments because the motion was denied on the basis petitioner “failed to follow the pertinent pleading requirements.” He did not dispute this. As to his evidentiary issues, he did not cite any “authority for the proposition that a GAL or guardian may not include hearsay in nontestimonial offerings, such as written or oral reports to the court. Nor does he identify precisely what grandmother or the GAL said that constituted slander or speculation, or identify any lay opinion testimony that the [trial] court accepted that should have been the exclusive province of experts.” Thus, he did not “show that the trial court relied on any improper evidence.” The court further concluded he failed “to identify any specific statutory or regulatory provision prohibiting a court from considering a parent’s mental health when deciding child-custody matters.” And he did not offer any “authority that would limit a court’s use of such information.” He also offered no analysis as to what particular authorities “were violated in connection with [S’s] evaluation, or the actions allegedly taken by [S] (other than the vague reference to reliance on Zoom), grandmother, or AE’s GAL, that resulted in such violations.”