e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 81958
Opinion Date : 07/18/2024
e-Journal Date : 07/23/2024
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : McDade v. Progressive Ins. Co.
Practice Area(s) : Insurance Litigation
Judge(s) : Per Curiam - Letica, Boonstra, and Mariani
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Issues:

First-party no-fault action; Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Whether defendant was certified in Michigan under MCL 500.3163; MCL 500.3113; Waiver of a noncertification defense for failure to plead it as an affirmative defense; Leave to amend; MCR 2.118; Weymers v Khera; Bad faith; Prejudice

Summary

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendant-insurer’s motion for leave to amend its affirmative defenses. And, because no genuine issue of material fact existed that defendant was not certified in Michigan, defendant was not liable to provide plaintiff with PIP benefits. Plaintiff, an Illinois resident, sought PIP benefits for injuries she sustained in a car crash in Michigan. Defendant asserted that it had no duty to pay the benefits as it was not certified in Michigan under MCL 500.3163. The trial court agreed and granted its motion for summary disposition. In a prior appeal, the court reversed, agreeing with plaintiff that defendant waived its noncertification defense by failing to plead it in its affirmative defenses. The Supreme Court denied leave. Defendant later filed its amended affirmative defenses, specifically pleading that plaintiff was not eligible for PIP benefits because it had not filed a certification. Plaintiff filed an interlocutory application from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to amend its affirmative defenses, which was denied. The Supreme Court also denied interlocutory review. The trial court ultimately granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition. In the present appeal, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the trial court abused its discretion “by granting defendant leave to amend its affirmative defenses nearly four years after defendant first learned of its failure to properly plead its noncertification defense.” It found that, under the circumstances, there was “no indication that defendant’s delay in amending its affirmative defenses was somehow undue or nefarious and such delay, alone, was not sufficient to deny its motion for leave to amend.” In addition, plaintiff “did not suffer the loss of these claims that she would have otherwise had if defendant filed the affirmative defense earlier. Rather, plaintiff could have pursued these sources of coverage and she simply did not.” Affirmed.

Full PDF Opinion