Speedy trial; Prejudice; Right to a public trial; Whether the courtroom was closed; Ineffective assistance of counsel

Holding that defendant’s rights to a speedy trial, a public trial, and to the effective assistance of counsel were not violated, the court affirmed his first-degree murder, AWIM, FIP, CCW, and felony-firearm convictions. He first argued “that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.” The court concluded that the first 16 months of the delay here were “attributed to the prosecution but with a neutral tint while the remaining” 15-month delay was due to COVID-19 and “attributed to neither party.” Thus, on balance, this factor did not support defendant’s speedy-trial claim. Because he “did not formally assert the right until approximately 27 months after his arrest, this factor” also did not support his speedy-trial claim. Finally, the record did not support his claims that he was prejudiced by the delay. The court noted that “‘anxiety alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation’” and it determined that he did not show prejudice to the defense. Defendant next argued “that the trial court violated his right to a public trial when it closed the courtroom during closing arguments.” The court disagreed because the record did not support his claim that the courtroom was actually closed. Because there was “no indication that members of the general public were precluded from attending trial, defendant has not shown that his right to a public trial was violated.” In essence, the trial “court simply let people know that closing arguments in a murder case, rather than usual docket activities, were being conducted in the courtroom and that people wanting to check-in with court staff would need to do so elsewhere. This does not rise to the level of a partial closure of the courtroom.” Finally, defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel for any of the “myriad of reasons” he alleged.