Other acts evidence; Speedy trial; People v Williams; People v Smith; Prejudice; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Plea-agreement negotiations; Sentencing; Scoring OV 6 at 50 points; Habitual offender; People v Gardner

Holding that there were no errors warranting reversal, the court affirmed defendant-Curry’s convictions and sentence. He was convicted of AWIM, felony-firearm, and FIP. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 480 months to 100 years for AWIM, 60 months to 100 years for the FIP, and 5 years for felony-firearm to be served consecutive to his sentences for the other convictions. He first argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting other acts evidence suggesting that he was a drug dealer. The court concluded that because no other acts evidence was admitted, there was no factual basis for his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting such evidence. Curry next argued that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Because the delay was more than 18 months, it was presumed that he was prejudiced. The trial court properly found that factor one favored him. Here, as in Smith, the court held that “it was ‘the extenuating circumstances brought about by the pandemic’ that prevented the prosecution from trying Curry in a speedy fashion. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err by declining to attribute the reason for the delay to the prosecution.” The court noted that the “third factor considers when the defendant first asserts his or her right to a speedy trial.” It found that “Curry first asserted his right to a speedy trial in [10/20], which is approximately 15 months after his arrest in” 7/19. He reasserted his right in 7/21. The trial court did not clearly err by weighing factor three in his favor. “The final factor considers prejudice to the defendant.” The court held that “two of the Williams factors were neutral and two weighed in favor of Curry.” Despite its neutral weight, the trial “court found that the most important factor in this case was the reason for the delay. Indeed, given the unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic and the response to it, holding a trial was impossible. Considering that there was no prejudice to the defense, a finding that this factor overwhelmed the factors favoring the defense is not clearly erroneous. Thus, balancing all the relevant factors, we conclude that Curry did not establish a violation of his right to a speedy trial.” Also, Curry could not “establish that his secondary lawyer provided constitutionally deficient assistance.” Finally, the trial court did not err by finding that his conduct was premeditated and scoring OV 6 at 50 points.