Injuries on a city bus; Governmental immunity; MCL 691.1407(1); Mack v Detroit; The motor-vehicle exception; MCL 691.1405; Vicarious liability; Respondeat superior; Laster v Henry Ford Health Sys; Leave to amend; Negligence; Distinguishing Moncrief v Detroit; Principle that an intentional tort is not itself an exception to governmental immunity; Genesee Cnty Drain Comm’r v Genesee Cnty; Proper party; MCR 2.201(C)(5); MCL 600.2051(4); Davis v Chrysler Corp; Detroit Department of Transportation (DDOT)

The court held that plaintiff sufficiently pleaded her respondeat superior claim in avoidance of governmental immunity. She sued defendants for injuries she sustained while riding on a city bus. The trial court dismissed her negligence claim against defendant-bus driver and found defendants-city and DDOT were entitled to immunity as to plaintiff’s owner’s-liability claim. However, it denied summary disposition for the city and DDOT as to her respondeat superior claim. On appeal, the court found plaintiff “sufficiently pleaded a claim for respondeat superior in avoidance of governmental immunity and established a genuine issue of material fact regarding the city’s liability under a theory of respondeat superior.” The fact that the complaint “contained additional allegations of negligent entrustment that are not within the scope of the motor-vehicle exception does not change the fact that the complaint otherwise stated a valid claim under the motor-vehicle exception in avoidance of governmental immunity.” And to the extent the complaint was “deficient for failing to cite MCL 691.1405, the trial court should permit [plaintiff] to cure this through amendment.” The court also rejected defendants’ contention that “even if plaintiff properly pleaded a claim under the motor-vehicle exception, they are entitled to summary disposition” because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to her ability to establish this claim. It noted her testimony supported an inference that the bus driver “was distracted while driving by talking on the phone and arguing with a passenger, and that she forcefully applied the brakes under circumstances where there was no apparent need for an immediate stop.” The court further rejected defendants’ argument that the trial court erred by failing to grant their summary disposition motion because plaintiff alleged an intentional tort, namely, an assault and battery, which is not an exception to governmental immunity. Although the bus driver’s “conduct toward the man that said ‘just drive’ may have been an intentional battery, the effect of the same conduct on plaintiff sounds in negligence.” Finally, however, it agreed that DDOT should have been dismissed because it was not a proper party to the case. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.