Search & seizure; Motion to suppress; Whether a search warrant was supported by “probable cause”; The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule; United States v Leon; Denial of an evidentiary hearing on the warrant; Franks v Delaware; Denial of defendant’s motion for supplemental discovery; FedRCrimP 16; United States v Armstrong; Confidential informant (CI)

In an en banc decision, the court held that a substantial basis supported the “conclusion that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the” apartment that was the subject of the search warrant. Further, “the officers acted in good faith in securing the warrant” and defendant-Sanders did not show a Franks hearing was warranted. Thus, the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from the apartment. The court also upheld the denial of his motion for supplemental discovery. Sanders was charged with several drug and weapons offenses based on evidence obtained through controlled drug buys with a CI and the search of his apartment. After his motion to suppress and his discovery requests were denied, he pled guilty, preserving in part his right to appeal. The court first considered, and rejected, his claim that the search warrant for the apartment was not supported by probable cause. It found that the “controlled buys themselves justified a finding of probable cause.” Sanders challenged the CI’s tip, claiming it lacked specificity. But the court held that “there was ample evidence to infer that the tip was worth pursuing.” Sanders also argued the affidavit was insufficient because it contained no evidence that contraband was seen at or near the apartment. The court rejected the argument that “a probable cause nexus can never be satisfied by a warrant affidavit that establishes only that a defendant is a known drug dealer who lives at a certain location[.]” It concluded that to the extent it had “ever suggested as much, the weight of our case law, as it does in so many probable cause contexts, rejects such a bright-line rule.” It noted that apart from “stray suggestions in the known drug dealer context, we have never required ‘prior, actual observation of all the items listed in a search warrant’ to establish a probable cause nexus; circumstantial evidence that contraband might be found at the place to be searched suffices.” Further, the CI “engaged in two controlled drug buys with Sanders. On both occasions, officers observed Sanders drive from the buy location to the apartment in question.” The court also rejected his arguments based on exceptions to Leon’s exception to the exclusionary rule, and found that his “basis for exclusion under Franks is underwhelming.” As to his motion for supplemental discovery under Rule 16, he sought disclosure of documents relating to the controlled buys. The court has held that “Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) allows for production of only those items that would ‘help [the defendant] combat the government’s case against him as to one of the charged crimes.’” It found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanders’s requests. Simply “asserting that ‘discovery . . . could . . . vitiate[] the government’s case’ is insufficient to trigger Rule 16’s discovery obligations.” Further, he could not show that the unavailability of the documents affected his substantial rights. Affirmed.