Governmental immunity as a purported agent of a township; The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); McLean v City of Dearborn

The court held that defendant (which provides vehicle towing and removal services) was not entitled to governmental immunity from plaintiff’s claims that it “was negligent or grossly negligent in removing” vehicles from his property pursuant to a court order related to a township ordinance violation. Plaintiff pled “responsible to an ordinance violation relating to the improper storage of unregistered and inoperable vehicles on his property, and the trial court entered an order authorizing the Township to enter plaintiff’s property and remove the vehicles.” Defendant removed the vehicles under a police officer’s supervision. “Plaintiff and several other police officers and township representatives were also present during the removal.” Defendant asserted it was entitled to governmental immunity as to plaintiff’s claims “because it was acting as the Township’s agent when the alleged torts occurred.” The trial court granted its summary disposition motion. On appeal, the court agreed with plaintiff that “defendant was not entitled to governmental immunity.” Defendant asserted, based on language in McLean, “that ‘Michigan law is clear that the protections of governmental immunity extend not only to government officers and employees, but also to a government’s agents.’ McLean, however, did not hold this, or involve a private entity attempting to claim immunity under the GTLA on the basis of its status as an ‘agent’ of a governmental entity. Nor, for that matter, did McLean in any way suggest that the GTLA’s grant of immunity should be read to extend beyond its stated scope. And while the term ‘agent’ appears elsewhere in the GTLA, . . . the Legislature chose not to include it in the grants of immunity” in MCL 691.1407(1) and (2). Further, there was “no relevant authority showing that immunity from tort liability under these” GTLA provisions extend “to private corporate entities conducting business with a governmental agency, such as defendant in this case. To the contrary, Michigan courts have repeatedly concluded otherwise.” Thus, the court reversed the trial court’s order granting defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and remanded.