Involuntary mental-health treatment; Notice of hospitalization; Distinguishing In re Jestila; Right to be present

The court affirmed the probate court’s order granting the petition for involuntary mental-health treatment. First, respondent argued “that the trial court’s failure to ensure that a notice of hospitalization was filed was plain error because it violated respondent’s due-process rights,” citing Jestila. However, it was distinguishable. Here, “the notice of hospitalization was not filed with the court within 24 hours stating that respondent needed to be hospitalized, pursuant to MCL 330.1431(1). Respondent was personally served with the notice of hearing and advice of rights” five days before the hearing. Thus, “the trial court plainly erred by failing to recognize that a notice of hospitalization was not timely issued, thereby failing to comply with the requirements of MCL 330.1431(1).” Unlike the respondent in “Jestila, however, this error did not affect respondent’s substantial rights because respondent was provided with a notice of hearing and advice of rights 5 days in advance of the hearing, the hearing was not rescheduled, and respondent was present throughout the hearing.” Also unlike the trial court in “Jestila, the trial court in this case complied with the ‘procedural safeguards ensuring respondent’s rights to be present and heard’ and, therefore, did not commit a ‘significant error.’” Second, respondent argued that “although his attorney complied with the requirements of MCL 330.1454, respondent’s son testified that respondent did not have a clear memory of meeting with his attorney and, did not have his documents that respondent kept at home; therefore, respondent was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel because he could not sufficiently prepare for trial.” This argument was unavailing. “Respondent’s attorney complied with the statutory procedures required of her pursuant to the Mental Health Code, and respondent was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Finally, respondent argued “that he was deprived of his right to be present because he was not present at the end of the hearing.” The court held that his “absence in the final minutes of the hearing did not violate his right to be present at the hearing, nor did it affect his ability to fully participate.” Thus, there was no plain error affecting respondent’s substantial rights.