The Uniform Budgeting & Accounting Act; Disbursement of funds appropriated by a county board of commissioners (the Commission) for the county prosecutor’s office; Interpretation of a municipal charter; Use of independent legal counsel; MCL 49.73; MCL 691.1408(3); Equitable estoppel; Contempt for interfering with the prosecutor’s discretion to spend funds appropriated by the Commission; Subject-matter jurisdiction; Bay Cnty Clerk v Bay Cnty Exec (Unpub); MCL 141.438(9); Capacity to sue; Timeliness; MCL 141.438(7); Frank v Linkner; Collateral estoppel

The court held that it had original jurisdiction here under MCL 141.438(7), that plaintiff-county prosecutor had “the capacity to file suit, and that the suit was timely filed.” It further concluded he did not fail to state a claim against defendant-County given the language of the county charter, and collateral estoppel did not bar this action. It also held “that the charter authorizes the Commission to appropriate funds so plaintiff may hire independent legal counsel.” This dispute concerned $42,500 “for the retention of five law firms to provide independent legal counsel to plaintiff.” Plaintiff sought an order directing defendant-County Executive (Hackel) “to disburse specific funds appropriated by” the Commission. After rejecting defendants’ arguments for dismissal, the court further determined that a prior decision involving the parties, while helpful here, did “not operate to collaterally estop defendants.” It then considered the gravamen of the dispute – “whether the charter provisions authorize plaintiff to obtain public funds for independent legal representation.” He contended that it does, while defendants asserted it does not. The court determined that the charter language supported plaintiff’s position. Central to its analysis was § 6.6.5. While it “indicates that an elected county official cannot expend funds on independent counsel, it has an exception if such an expenditure is permitted by law. The Commission appropriated the funds, then issued a resolution that specifically authorized their use for independent legal counsel, and defendants have not cited anything in the charter proscribing that authority or process.” Given that it was “undisputed that the purpose of the appropriation was plaintiff’s retention of independent counsel,” Hackel lacked the “authority to frustrate that purpose. Where the charter permits the Commission to appropriate funds for plaintiff to use independent legal counsel, Hackel should not have impounded the funds absent a showing of economic efficiencies.” The court denied the County’s motion to dismiss, and granted in part plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition as to Count III, in which he sought mandamus as to the five outside legal contracts. It denied the complaint in all other respects and denied plaintiff’s motion for show cause as to civil contempt. It issued a writ of mandamus directing Hackel “to disburse the funds to plaintiff and directing that the parties work together to facilitate the appropriate contracts.”