Search & seizure; Constitutionality of a warrantless search of a probationer’s property without reasonable suspicion or a signed waiver; United States v Knights; “Common authority”; Consent; People v Farrow

The court held that a “warrantless search of a probationer’s property, without reasonable suspicion or a signed waiver of Fourth Amendment protections pursuant to an order of probation, is unconstitutional.” Thus, it vacated the trial court’s order denying defendant-Chandler’s motion to suppress. Given that the record was undeveloped as to whether Chandler’s “cousin had ‘common authority’ to consent to the search of [his] room and whether that consent was voluntary,” the court remanded as to that matter. He first argued “that the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his bedroom should be vacated because the search was unconstitutional.” The court agreed. His “probation order simply stated he was to submit to a search of his person and property. It did not include the requirement of reasonable cause as was stated at sentencing.” Using the totality-of-circumstances test from Knights, the court took “note of the importance of the trial court’s probation order as a salient circumstance. However, Chandler did not sign or date the probation order, and there is no indication that he was aware of its contents or consented to the same. In fact, at sentencing, [he] was told that he would be subject to searches if reasonable cause or suspicion existed that he had violated the terms of probation or committed a crime.” As a result, the court concluded “that the warrantless search of [his] bedroom violated” his Fourth Amendment rights. “Barring any other Fourth Amendment exception to the warrant requirement, the fruits of this search should have been suppressed.” Chandler asserted “that the search was also not a valid consent search because the prosecution failed to meet its burden to show that his cousin properly consented to the search.” The record reflected that his cousin was the homeowner. “The extent of his provision of the living quarters is less clear.” The court found that given “how lacking the record is regarding this issue, we believe further development in the trial court is appropriate as to this question of consent. This inquiry should include whether the consent itself was ‘unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.’”