Criminal contempt for violating a domestic personal protection order (PPO); Standard of proof; “Beyond a reasonable doubt”; “Stalking,” “harassment,” “course of conduct,” & “emotional distress”; Totality of the circumstances; Right to present a defense; Extension of the PPO; MCR 3.707(B)(1); MCR 3.708(H)(5)

Under the circumstances, the court held “that the trial court did not violate respondent’s due process rights or otherwise abuse its discretion by considering the totality of the circumstances and determining that his conduct violated the PPO beyond a reasonable doubt.” Also, he did not show “that the absence of his son’s testimony affected the outcome of the contempt proceedings, or that he was denied his constitutional right to present his defense.” Finally, he did not establish that the trial “court’s sua sponte extension of the PPO constituted plain error that affected his substantial rights[.]” Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order finding respondent guilty of criminal contempt for violating a domestic PPO concerning petitioner and extending the duration of the PPO. Respondent argued “that the trial court did not properly apply the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard in finding him guilty of criminal contempt because it relied on the totality of the circumstances.” The court concluded that “the trial court did not adjudicate [his] guilt under an incorrect view of the law by assessing [his] conduct from a totality-of-the-circumstances perspective.” Further, it did not otherwise err in determining, “beyond a reasonable doubt and based on the totality of the circumstances, that [he] (1) continued to engage in a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of petitioner that would cause a reasonable person emotional distress, and did cause petitioner emotional distress, in violation of the PPO’s prohibition of stalking, or (2) engaged in ‘a continuous pattern of . . . interfering in [petitioner’s] daily life one way or another’ in violation of the PPO’s prohibition of engaging in conduct that impaired petitioner’s environment.” It was proper for the trial “court to consider respondent’s continued pattern of harassing and intimidating conduct toward petitioner, i.e., the totality of the circumstances, to establish that he violated the PPO, particularly where the PPO plainly prohibited such conduct.” The court concluded “that the evidence, viewed as a whole and in context, sufficed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent violated the PPO.”