e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 81858
Opinion Date : 06/27/2024
e-Journal Date : 06/28/2024
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Jaber v. P & P Hospitality, LLC
Practice Area(s) : Litigation Negligence & Intentional Tort
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Letica, Cavanagh, and Swartzle
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Issues:

The court’s jurisdiction; MCR 7.203; “Final order”; Aggrieved party; Effect of a consent or stipulated final order on an appeal from an earlier order; Sandoval v Farmers Ins Exch; Consent judgments & settlement agreements as contracts; Whether negligence claims as to employees’ training & supervision were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Dramshop Act   

Summary

While it concluded Sandoval was wrongly decided, the court was bound by it to dismiss plaintiff’s appeal in this dramshop/negligence action for lack of jurisdiction. Under Sandoval, “a consent or stipulated final order does not allow for an appeal from an earlier order unless a party reserved the right to appeal the underlying order in the stipulation to the order of dismissal.” Failure to do so results in the court lacking jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Plaintiff sued defendants-P & P and Randall (who she alleged was overserved at P & P’s establishment) asserting negligence claims and dramshop liability. She later agreed to the dismissal of the dramshop claim but continued to pursue her negligence claims. “The trial court dismissed the dramshop claim in light of the parties’ agreement” and further concluded the Dramshop Act’s “exclusive remedy provision precluded an independent cause of action for negligence[.]” On appeal, the court found that “plaintiff was an aggrieved party from the underlying order granting” P & P summary disposition. But the case “was not closed at that time and a final order was not entered because” of the claims against Randall. After he was dismissed, plaintiff was entitled to pursue an appeal of right. The court concluded that under “the plain language of the court rule” she was an aggrieved party given the earlier adverse summary disposition decision and she “appealed from the final order that dismissed the remaining parties and closed the case.” Thus, the court would find it had jurisdiction because she “was an aggrieved party and was entitled to appeal the trial court’s adverse summary disposition ruling related to P & P.” It would find that she “was not required to reserve the right to appeal an earlier order granting P & P’s dispositive motion in the final order of dismissal because P & P was no longer a participant in the litigation and not a party to the final order closing the case. But, the Sandoval majority determined that a final order must contain language reserving the right to appeal the earlier order granting summary disposition, and the failure to do so requires” dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that Sandoval was wrongly decided because it correlated the court’s “jurisdiction to the inclusion of specific language in a lower court order rather than on the court rules governing jurisdiction and it ignored the application of contract principles.” The court added that it agreed with plaintiff the trial court erred in ruling “her negligence claims addressing the training and supervision of P & P’s employees were barred by the” Dramshop Act’s exclusive remedy provision. Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Full PDF Opinion