Notice requirements in MCL 600.6431; “Personal,” “injury,” & “personal injury”; Absolute prosecutorial immunity; Qualified immunity; Intentional torts; Gross negligence; Constitutional claims; 42 USC § 1983; Search & seizure; Procedural due process; Equal protection; Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)

The court concluded that because plaintiffs “gave notice seven months after accrual, the trial court did not err by summarily dismissing their claims against the state of Michigan, the Attorney General’s Office, and DHHS.” The trial court also did not err by holding defendant-Pheney “was entitled to absolute immunity and by granting” him summary disposition on the constitutional and tort claims. Because a genuine issue of material fact did not exist on the issue of whether defendants-Massey and Sampson were entitled to qualified immunity on the defamation and IIED claims, the trial court did not err in dismissing them. Further, they were “entitled to immunity on the gross-negligence claims under MCL 691.1407(2).” Finally, plaintiffs’ constitutional claims failed. Plaintiffs-Hall and Genuine Solutions asserted that Pheney “was acting in an investigative capacity.” The record reflected “that Pheney, who was working as an assistant attorney general in the Health Care Fraud Division of the Attorney General’s office, was the lawyer that was assigned to” plaintiffs’ case. A “special agent investigated the matter, and Pheney’s name appeared on the special agent’s reports.” But there was “no indication from the investigation reports that Pheney determined which witnesses to interview, questioned witnesses personally or determined what questions to ask, observed interviews, or gathered documentary evidence before charges were initiated. The investigation reports only support that the special agent interviewed former interns and the parents of minor clients. Based upon the evidence gathered by the special agent, and information gathered during Hall’s interview, Pheney believed probable cause existed to support pursuing criminal charges against Hall” and filed a felony complaint. Thus, the court held that “even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the record does not support a finding that the functions of Pheney and the special agent” were the same. Instead, the evidence supported “a finding that Pheney reviewed the evidence collected by the special agent and determined probable cause existed to pursue criminal charges.” Under these facts, the trial court did not err by holding Pheney was entitled to absolute immunity. As to the intentional-tort claims against Massey and Sampson, the court concluded the undisputed evidence established they “reasonably believed that they were acting within the scope of their authority and acted in good faith, i.e., without ‘malicious intent,’ ‘capricious action,’ or ‘corrupt conduct,’ when signing the order of suspension.” The court noted they “were presented with evidence that Hall, who was a provider, had been charged with Medicaid fraud. This was accurate information and was reflected in the order of suspension.” Affirmed.