Sufficient evidence of resisting or obstructing an officer (MCL 750.81d(1)); Sufficient evidence of fourth-degree fleeing & eluding (MCL 750.479a); People v Grayer; Prosecutorial error; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); A police witness’s testimony; MRE 701 & 704

The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions of resisting or obstructing an officer and fourth-degree fleeing and eluding. It also rejected his prosecutorial error claims. The court found that the state trooper’s (W) “testimony was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that defendant received a lawful command and failed to comply. [W] testified that he told defendant to turn off the car, open the door, and get out of the car, and that defendant failed to follow his instructions. After considering the testimony and watching the dashcam video, the jury resolved the conflicting testimony and determined that defendant failed to comply with at least one of” W’s commands. The court noted that it does “not second-guess the jury’s credibility determinations, but must make credibility determinations that support its’ verdict.” The jury here credited W’s “testimony and the fact that seconds passed between the trooper’s command and defendant’s failure to comply is not dispositive because resistance ‘can occur in even the briefest of moments[.]’” As to the fleeing and eluding conviction, “the jury heard defendant’s claimed justification for failing to heed [W’s] initial use of the lights and siren and [W’s] subsequent use of the lights and commands before it convicted him. Notably, despite the alleged emergency, defendant and his girlfriend did not travel to the nearest hospital, [his] girlfriend declined medical assistance and an EMS transport, and” their baby did not arrive until 16 days after the traffic stop. Defendant admitted at trial that he knew W “turned his lights on two separate occasions.” The court noted that the “defense theory was that defendant called 911 when he noticed the lights to explain why he was driving so quickly and not stopping. Intrinsic to this argument is defendant’s acknowledgment that [W] was commanding him to stop. Moreover, the evidence further supported a rational inference that defendant saw [W] turning around and purposefully sped up to avoid being stopped. Likewise, [his] failure to comply with [W’s] commands during the traffic stop was further circumstantial evidence that defendant acted with the requisite intent to flee and elude.” Affirmed.