Restraint element of kidnapping; MCL 750.349(2); Effect of the victim’s voluntary entry into a vehicle; CSC I under MCL 750.520b(1)(c); CSC II under MCL 750.520c(1)(c); Sentencing; Scoring of OV 10; MCL 777.40(1)(a); People v Cannon; People v Kosik; People v Barnes; “Predatory conduct”; “Exploitation” & “vulnerability”

The court held that there was sufficient evidence “for the jury to find restraint as defined in MCL 750.349” and thus, there was no merit in defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his kidnapping and CSC convictions. It also held that the trial court did not err in scoring OV 10 at 15 points in sentencing him. He was resentenced to concurrent terms of 15 to 40 years for his kidnapping conviction, 14 to 25 years for his CSC I conviction, and 5 to 15 years for his CSC II conviction. He argued that the prosecution did not provide sufficient “evidence of the victim’s restraint to establish that he kidnapped” her and, because the kidnapping crime “served as the felony committed to support the” CSC charges, there was also insufficient evidence for those convictions. The court disagreed, rejecting his “contention that the victim’s voluntary entry into his vehicle negates the knowingly restraint element of kidnapping. Consent is a complete defense to kidnapping only if it has not been obtained by fraud, duress, or threats.” The court concluded the jury could have reasonably found “that any consent by the victim to enter defendant’s car was obtained by fraud.” She got into his “car under the mistaken belief that [he] would drive her home, leaving her near the vet clinic. However, [he] drove past the vet clinic to a secluded area in the back parking lot near a trash can. Contrary to his argument, this act was indeed inconsistent with his agreement to drive the victim to an area near her apartment but outside the view of her mother. The jury was entitled to conclude that [he] did not offer to drive [her] home because he was a nice person from their common native land, but used that information as a ruse to get [her] into his car. Once inside, [he] secreted [her] in the area behind the vet clinic, where no one was present, and there he sexually assaulted her. [He] restrained [her] when he did not drop her off near her home, but continued to a secluded area to which she did not agree. And, the victim testified that being restrained during the sexual assault in the front seat prevented her from attempting to exit the locked Jeep as well as the sexual assault that transpired in the backseat.” The court held that, viewing “the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any consent obtained by defendant was obtained by fraud and that defendant’s real intention had been to sexually assault the victim.” Affirmed.