Jury instructions; MCR 2.512(B)(2); “Lady Bird” deeds; Harmless error; Remedies; Deed reformation & revocation; Specific performance; Zurcher v Herveat

The court concluded plaintiff could not show that any error in not instructing the jury on the operation of Lady Bird deeds was outcome-determinative. It also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reforming a 2018 deed and revoking a 2019 deed related to the property at issue. After plaintiff was injured in an auto accident, defendant moved into plaintiff’s home and “plaintiff offered to leave defendant the house in exchange for defendant providing plaintiff with help.” While this agreement was not reduced to writing, in 2018 “plaintiff executed a ‘Lady Bird’ warranty deed granting a future interest in the property to defendant and her son[.]” Plaintiff subsequently executed the 2019 deed, a “Lady Bird quitclaim deed, revoking the transfer of interest to defendant and her son, and instead giving a future interest in the property to plaintiff’s friend,” R. Plaintiff sought to evict defendant, who counterclaimed for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, among other claims. A jury found in defendant’s favor on those claims. As to plaintiff’s jury instruction argument, the court noted the “jury was asked to determine whether plaintiff and defendant had an agreement under which plaintiff would give defendant the house in exchange for assistance and whether plaintiff breached that agreement. The jury answered those questions in the affirmative. Whether the underlying deed was a Lady Bird deed or otherwise was immaterial to this question.” Further, by affirmatively approving the trial “court’s instructions (with the exception of the explanation of the Lady Bird deeds), plaintiff waived any claim of instructional error on appeal.” As to her challenge to the trial court’s remedies, she contended specific performance was not appropriate “because the 2019 quitclaim deed gave the property to [R], who was a good-faith purchaser[.]” As a result, plaintiff argued “defendant was only entitled to receive what she would have on rescission, i.e., the amount already paid plus interest.” However, this ignored the fact that the trial “court had the discretion, if equity required, to order specific performance in lieu of money damages. The jury found that [she] breached the agreement she made with defendant to leave her the property after she died.” To effectuate this promise, the trial “court exercised its discretion and reformed the 2018 warranty deed. This was not an abuse of [its] discretion.” Affirmed.