Sufficient evidence for a third-degree child abuse conviction; MCL 750.136b(5); People v Lawhorn; “Physical injury”; State of mind; Void for vagueness; People v Gregg; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a special jury instruction defining reasonable force

The court held that (1) there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s third-degree child abuse conviction, (2) the statute is not void for vagueness, and (3) her trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a special jury instruction on reasonable force. She was also convicted of domestic violence. The victim was her daughter, J. Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to the state of mind element of MCL 750.136b(5), asserting there was no evidence she “intended to cause physical harm. However, ‘[m]inimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove an actor’s state of mind.’” The court noted that she admitted to hitting J “with a belt, and there was evidence she also hit [J] with a phone charger. ‘[A] jury may presume that a person intended the natural consequences of their actions.’” The court found the fact that she hit J “with a belt and phone charger with sufficient force to cause scars still present two years later is enough evidence for a rational finder of fact to conclude that defendant intended to cause physical harm.” She emphasized evidence that she was trying to hit J’s buttocks, but J “squirmed, causing defendant to hit her legs. There are three problems with this argument. First, defendant told the detective that she would sometimes hit [J’s] arms and legs. Second, a jury could infer that any reasonable person would anticipate that a young child would squirm in anticipation of being hit. Third, it is not clear to us how defendant’s purported intent to hit [J’s] buttocks helps her case; there is no evidence suggesting that the skin on [J’s] buttocks was less susceptible to injury than the skin on her legs. Defendant also relies on MCL 750.136b(9), suggesting that the prosecution did not prove that her actions did not constitute reasonable parent discipline. However, a jury could rationally conclude that hitting a child with a belt and a phone charger hard enough to leave scars is not a reasonable use of force.” As to her void for vagueness challenge, the court has considered and rejected this argument before and it declined her request to declare a conflict with Gregg and Lawhorn. Finally, as to her ineffective assistance argument, among other things the court concluded “an instruction essentially repeating the statute adequately apprised the jury. Second, a special instruction could have invaded the province of the jury because whether force is reasonable is a question of fact.” Affirmed.