Motion to terminate a PPO; Stalking, aggravated stalking, & cyberstalking under MCL 600.2950a(1); MCL 750.411h, i, & s; “Course of conduct,” “harassment,” & “unconsented contact”; Emotional distress; Freedom of speech; True threats; TM v MZ; Scope of the PPO

The court held that the trial court did not err by denying respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO, but did err by amending it to restrict him from coming within a quarter mile of the police station and city hall because this restriction substantially burdened his constitutionally-protected speech. It also found some of his speech was not constitutionally protected. Respondent was arrested by petitioner-police officer and other officers for disturbing the peace. He was released on bond and ordered to have no contact with petitioner. But he uploaded several videos on his social media sites, including videos claiming petitioner wrongfully arrested him. He also approached petitioner outside the police station. The charges were eventually dropped. Respondent continued to post videos, including one that showed a picture of petitioner’s family. The trial court granted petitioner’s PPO, which precluded respondent from approaching, contacting, or making online posts about petitioner. It then denied respondent’s motion to modify or terminate the PPO, finding his speech constituted true threats, and it also prohibited him from coming within a quarter mile of the police station or city hall. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by continuing the PPO because there was not reasonable cause to issue it, noting his posts amounted to unconsented contacts. “The language and context of the posts indicate they were directed at petitioner and his family. Based on the volume and content of the posts, it is clear respondent intended for petitioner to view them. Likewise, respondent more directly notified petitioner of the posts.” In addition, petitioner suffered emotional distress. Because a statutory basis to issue the PPO in relation to respondent’s electronic communications existed under MCL 750.411h and i, the court was not required to address whether a statutory basis existed to issue the PPO under MCL 750.411s. But it agreed with respondent that a statutory basis did not exist under that section because no evidence in the record supported that the posts “caused others to contact and harass petitioner.” The court rejected his claim that the trial court erred by issuing and continuing the PPO because the speech that formed the basis for the PPO was constitutionally protected, noting “the PPO was properly issued in response to harassing speech directed at petitioner’s family.” Finally, it agreed with respondent that the amended PPO burdened substantially more speech than necessary by prohibiting him from coming within a quarter mile of the police station and city hall, finding a “substantial portion of this burden does not further the goal of protecting petitioner from the harassment of his family.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.