Ineffective assistance of counsel; Prior convictions of possession of child sexual abuse material; “Listed offense”; Prejudice; MRE 403; Trial strategy; Failure to challenge five jurors for cause; Sufficiency of the evidence; CSC I & II; Whether the assault occurred during one single transaction; “Sexual contact”; Distinguishing People v Callahan; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 10 & 13

Finding no errors warranting reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s CSC I and II convictions and sentences. He was sentenced as a third offense habitual offender to serve concurrent sentences of 25 to 35 years for CSC I and 15 to 30 years for CSC II. Defendant first argued “that his trial counsel was ineffective because he voluntarily presented evidence of defendant’s prior convictions at trial during defendant’s direct examination.” He claimed “this evidence permitted the jury to render a verdict on the basis of defendant’s bad character rather than the evidence of his guilt.” The court held that admission “of defendant’s prior conviction of possession of child sexual abuse material was not unfairly prejudicial because it was a criminal conviction that happened near the time of defendant’s alleged assault of the victim and was also a crime involving defendant’s sexual misconduct with respect to another minor.” Although the record did not show “whether defendant was given notice of the prosecutor’s intent to use this evidence, defendant was clearly aware that his prior conviction was for sexual misconduct involving a minor. Furthermore, by admitting this evidence before the prosecutor, trial counsel could have reasonably been attempting to control the narrative regarding the conviction.” Also, the court found that “trial counsel could have reasonably believed that if defendant testified, he would be subject to cross-examination regarding his prior convictions under MRE 609.” As to juror bias, “counsel was not ineffective for failing to take a meritless position.” The court next rejected his argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions because the sexual assault occurred during one single transaction. It held that because CSC I and II are two separate crimes, “and sufficient evidence was presented on all the elements of both crimes, it is immaterial that the events occurred during a single continuous transaction.”