Sentencing; Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA); Whether defendant’s prior drug offenses qualified as “separate” predicate offenses where they occurred on three separate “occasions”; 18 USC § 924(e)(1); The “rule of lenity”; Whether the Fifth & Sixth Amendments require the government to charge the separateness of the ACCA predicates in an indictment & prove the supporting facts to a jury; Conditions of supervised release; § 3563(b)(22); The “risk notification” condition; USSG § 5D1.3(c)(12); Whether the condition’s language was “vague”; Whether it was an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority

The court held that the district court properly considered each of defendant-Campbell’s prior drug offenses as “separate” predicate offenses in sentencing him under the ACCA where they occurred months and miles apart. He was sentenced to 15 years for FIP after the district court ruled that his prior robbery and drug offenses triggered the ACCA’s mandatory minimum. Campbell argued, among other things, that it erred in finding that because his prior drug offenses were committed on three separate occasions, they qualified as three separate predicate offenses. The court disagreed, finding that time and distance factors were decisive in this case where the offenses were separated by months and by more than 800 miles. It rejected Campbell’s argument that because the offenses shared “a common ‘purpose’ (trafficking drugs)” they should not have been considered separately. It found that his view “would seemingly obviate” § 924(e)(1)’s text, which indicates “that ‘three’ ‘drug offense[s]’ can be three ACCA predicates[.]” Campbell also relied on the rule of lenity, but the court held that there could be no reasonable disagreement as to the “occasion” issue considering the months and miles between the offenses. It also rejected his claim “the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that the government charge the separateness of the ACCA predicates in an indictment and prove the supporting facts to a jury.” Under Sixth Circuit precedent, “a sentencing judge may decide whether prior offenses were committed on different occasions.” Further, Campbell admitted the different dates. Next, he challenged the district court’s imposition of the “risk notification” standard supervised release condition. The current USSG version “instructs that if a probation officer determines that a defendant poses ‘a risk’ to ‘another person,’ the probation officer may require the defendant to notify the person about the risk, and the defendant ‘shall’ comply.” The court noted it had upheld the new language in an unpublished opinion, and it now upheld it again. It rejected Campbell’s claim the condition was vague and violated his due process rights. It also rejected his contention the condition was an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority, finding the district “court reserved the ‘ultimate authority’ to determine the condition’s contours.” Affirmed.