Dispute between the owners of interests in an agreement to operate an oil well; Motion to set aside a default; Good cause & a meritorious defense; MCR 1.109(D)(3); MCR 2.603(D)(1); Alken-Ziegler, Inc v Waterbury Headers Corp; The trial court’s power to sanction; MCR 2.313; Order to compel discovery; MCR 2.313(A) & (B); MCR 2.313(A)(2)(a) & (b); Dean v Tucker; Dismissal as a sanction; MCR 2.502(A)(1); North v Department of Mental Health; Sanctions for filing a frivolous claim; MCL 600.2591(3)(a); MCR 1.109(E)(5) & (6)

Holding that the parties failed to identify any errors warranting relief, the court affirmed the trial court’s orders. Plaintiffs sued defendants over their involvement in the operation of an oil well, including several for acts taken as interest owners who supported defendants, and defendant-lawyer (Bieganowski) who represented some of the defendants in earlier litigation. After approximately five years of contentious litigation, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of progress after plaintiffs failed to pay a sanction within several months after it was ordered. However, the trial court refused the request for additional sanctions by Bieganowski and another defendant (Russell). On appeal, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred by setting aside a default entered against two defendants who failed to timely answer their second amended complaint. “Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err in concluding that the movants established good cause for their tardy response.” It also rejected their claim that the trial court erred by sanctioning them for misconduct involving experts, staying the case pending payment of the sanction, and then dismissing their claims for lack of progress after they failed to pay the sanction for several months. “Because the trial court had the authority to take the actions that it did, it did not err by misapplying the law to its exercise of discretion.” It also did not abuse its discretion by fashioning a remedy that included payment of the reasonable attorney fees at issue and staying the proceedings pending that payment. “Under the totality of these circumstances, it was entirely reasonable for the trial court to limit plaintiffs’ ability to further engage in [certain] tactics by staying the proceedings until [they] demonstrated their commitment to moving the case forward by paying the sanction.” And its “findings and determinations were sufficient to allow the trial court to dismiss the case under its inherent authority to punish misconduct.” Finally, the court rejected Russell’s and Bieganowski’s challenges to the trial court’s orders denying their requests for sanctions against plaintiffs for filing frivolous claims against them. “The record supported a finding that plaintiffs brought their claims against Russell and Bieganowski for improper purposes, but it also supported a contrary finding.” The trial court had overseen the proceedings for years and was intimately familiar with the parties, the legal arguments, and the evidence. Yet it impliedly rejected the evidence that plaintiffs had brought the claims for an improper purpose, and impliedly found there was at least some merit to some of the claims. On the record, the court could not conclude that the trial court erred by finding “plaintiffs did not bring the claims for an improper purpose, and the record does not show that the trial court otherwise misapplied the law when it denied the requests for sanctions.”