Successive motion for relief from judgment; Newly discovered evidence; People v Cress; Materiality; Opinion evidence; Brady violation; People v Chenault

Holding that the trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant-Smith’s successive motion for relief from judgment, the court reversed and remanded. He claimed that he was entitled to a new trial based on an affidavit from a defense expert (R) “that time-since-intercourse evidence is ‘junk science’ and evidence that the prosecution did not disclose exculpatory evidence that could have been used to impeach” a DNA analyst (H). The court concluded the trial court clearly erred by finding Smith was entitled to a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence from R. “The evidence’s materiality, not the evidence itself, was newly discovered.” In addition, Smith did not “establish that he could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence for trial. Finally, although newly discovered evidence can establish good cause for failing to bring claims in a prior motion,” Smith failed to establish actual prejudice. Contrary to the trial court’s determination, he “would not have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal with the benefit of’ R’s expertise. Further, “Smith was allowed one DNA expert at trial, who ultimately did not challenge the opinions of the prosecution experts. Because additional expert testimony about the timing of the allegedly consensual sex would have been of questionable relevance, and possibly harmful, to the defense, Smith could not establish that the absence of expert testimony from [R] ‘was so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that the conviction should not be allowed to stand regardless of its effect on the outcome of the case.’” The court also concluded that the trial court clearly erred when it held that evidence about H’s proficiency-testing was material. “Absent materiality, no Brady violation occurred.” Because there was no Brady violation, Smith could not “establish the good cause and actual prejudice required for his motion for relief from judgment.” Moreover, the court held that “because no Brady violation occurred, and the proficiency-testing impeachment evidence was so disconnected from the case at hand, Smith could not establish an ‘irregularity . . . so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that the conviction should not be allowed to stand regardless of its effect on the outcome of the case.”’ Thus, the court concluded the trial court erred in granting relief from judgment based on H’s “performance of proficiency testing for her supervisor.”