Quiet title action; The viability of the doctrine of common-law abandonment as applied to roads under the jurisdiction of county road commissions; MCL 600.5821; MCL 224.18; Ambs v Kalamazoo Cnty Rd Comm’n; Huron Mountain Club v Marquette Cnty Rd Comm’n; Principle that a highway may cease to be such by voluntary abandonment and non-use; Gardens of Rest v Upper MI Power & Light Co

The court held that because “nothing in either MCL 600.5821 or MCL 224.18 supports that the Legislature clearly intended to abrogate the doctrine of common-law abandonment,” the doctrine “remains a viable legal theory, and plaintiffs’ claim can proceed.” The trial court granted partial summary disposition for plaintiffs, finding that common-law abandonment is still a viable legal theory. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the Legislature barred claims for common-law abandonment against governmental entities in MCL 600.5821(2)(c) by stating that “those entities are not subject to claims for adverse possession, acquiescence for the statutory period, or prescriptive easement.” It noted the “clear and unambiguous language of MCL 600.5821(2)(c) lists only claims for ‘adverse possession, acquiescence for the statutory period, or a prescriptive easement,’ not common-law abandonment. This plainly suggests that the Legislature did not intend to include claims for common-law abandonment in the list of claims barred by MCL 600.5821(2)(c).” In addition, the court “has recognized the claim of common-law abandonment in recent years such as in Ambs, and the doctrine was well established in this state’s jurisprudence long before then.” As to defendant’s reliance on MCL 600.5821(2)(a) and (b), a plain reading suggests “those subsections only apply when the governmental entity is the plaintiff.” Not only was the court’s “interpretation of MCL 600.5821(2)(a) and (b) supported by the plain language of the statute, but it is preferable to defendant’s because it does not render any part of the statute surplusage.” The court next rejected defendant’s contention that plaintiffs’ claim failed because it was actually one for adverse possession or acquiescence and thus, explicitly barred by MCL 600.5821(2)(c). The “complaint clearly lays out a set of facts from which, if proven true, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that plaintiffs established a claim for common-law abandonment.” Finally, it rejected defendant’s alternative argument relying on MCL 224.18 and Huron Mountain Club. A “simple reading of Huron Mountain Club makes clear that it never addressed the issue raised by defendant here.” The sentence in that case that defendant relied “on remains true in the context of abandonment petitions initiated pursuant to MCL 224.18(4), but offers no guidance on whether MCL 224.18 provides the exclusive means by which a county road commission can abandon a public highway,” the question at issue here. Affirmed.