Motion for resentencing based on the trial court’s consideration of inaccurate information; People v Miles; Principle that when calculating the sentencing guidelines, a trial court may consider the contents of a PSIR; People v McChester; Accuracy of the PSIR; People v Waclawski; Effect of mental health issues in sentencing; People v Bennett; Right of allocution; People v Bailey; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Consideration of a lack of remorse; People v Walker

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for resentencing insofar as it was based on her having later been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. It also held that her sentences were not unreasonable. She pled guilty to embezzlement over $100,000, using a computer to commit a crime, uttering and publishing, and forgery for using her position as a bookkeeper to embezzle funds from the company. The trial court sentenced her concurrent terms of 7 to 20 years each for the embezzlement and use-of-a-computer convictions, and 3 to 14 years each for the uttering-and-publishing and forgery convictions. The court rejected her argument that the trial court erred by denying her motion for resentencing because it did not consider her mental illness while determining her sentences, and because her seven-year minimum sentences, which departed slightly from the recommended range under the guidelines, were not reasonable. “Defendant’s PSIR stated that she ‘claims to be in good mental and physical health,’ and later stated that ‘defendant denies any mental health concerns or diagnosis.’” Because she did not assert that she was “inaccurately quoted, and there was no other information before the court regarding her mental health” at the time of sentencing, “the information available to the court at the time relevant, which consisted entirely of reports of what defendant herself had to say about her mental health, cannot not be considered inaccurate.” In addition, the court reasoned that her “criminal conduct did not consist of impulsive acts, but rather was characterized by planning many years of transactions in order to illegally acquire a large amount of money while evading detection.” Further, the trial court properly accepted her “challenge to the PSIR, corrected the PSIR, and indicated that it did not consider whether defendant had bipolar disorder in fashioning its sentence.” Moreover, the trial court did not deprive her “of the opportunity to provide mitigating information to the court about her mental status during the commission of her crimes, including any information that would be considered a symptom of a mental illness by a person knowledgeable in that area.” And the trial court “indicated that its commentary, while perhaps unnecessary, was not a part of its reasoning at sentencing, or when denying defendant’s motion for resentencing.” Finally, the trial court “well established on the record that its minimal departure was ‘proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’” It did not indicate that defendant’s sentence was based on whether she had a psychological explanation for her crime, and the record supported the conclusion that greed was the major motivation. Affirmed.