Motion to quash; Suppression of physical evidence obtained during a traffic stop; Whether reasonable suspicion justified extending the stop; People v Kavanaugh; People v Coscarelli; A pat-down search for weapons; The “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule; People v Mahdi; The automobile exception to the search warrant requirement; Suppression of defendant’s statements; Whether she was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda v Arizona; People v Barritt; Waiver

The court held that while the state trooper (S) who stopped defendant’s vehicle was justified in making the stop, he did not have reasonable suspicion justifying extending it. He also was not justified in conducting a pat-down search of her person for weapons. Further, “the discovery of the contraband in defendant’s vehicle was not truly inevitable” and thus, the trial court erred in denying her motion to quash. The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the trial court erred in suppressing defendant’s statements made in the patrol vehicle, finding that she was subject to a custodial interrogation, and she did not waive her right against self-incrimination. Thus, any evidence resulting from the unconstitutional prolonged stop was inadmissible as substantive evidence, as were defendant’s unwarned statements. Because the only evidence supporting the charges against her was obtained after the unconstitutional prolonged stop, the court reversed the trial court’s order denying her motion to quash the bindover and remanded for entry of an order granting her motion. In considering the extension of the stop, the court found the facts here were analogous to Coscarelli. Similar to that case, “defendant’s mere presence at a location where drug activity was suspected ‘provides no particular basis for suspicion concerning [her] participation in criminal activity.’” Thus, this did not provide a basis for S to “have possessed a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity . . . .” In addition, the “evasive behavior” he identified—that she “was eating and drinking during the stop, evading questions, and changing conversation topics—also did not provide a basis for reasonable suspicion.” The court noted that the prosecution did not offer any case law “to support that eating and drinking are evasive or ‘strange’ behaviors, and [S] did not explain how or why, based on his experience or knowledge, eating and drinking in a vehicle during a traffic stop provided grounds to suspect defendant of criminal activity.” Further, and importantly, he failed to “articulate what specific questions defendant evaded, the answers that defendant provided, or why the exchange indicated any likelihood of criminal activity.” There also was no basis for the pat-down search where S did not have “reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and posed a danger to him or to others.”