Divorce; Entry of the judgment; MCR 2.602(B)(3) (the “seven-day rule”); Property division; Responsibility for a tax penalty for a retirement account withdrawal; An arbitration award from a motor vehicle accident as separate property; Pickering v Pickering; Spousal support; Loutts v Loutts; Fault; Need; Attorney fees; MCR 3.206(D)

The court found that even if the seven-day rule applied, entry of the divorce judgment did not violate it. The property division was also equitable. But while it affirmed the trial court’s challenged factual findings as to spousal support, it reversed the denial of defendant-ex-husband’s (G’Sell) request for spousal support and remanded for further findings and clarification. It did the same as to the denial of his request for attorney fees. The court first noted that plaintiff-ex-wife (Grazier) “did not seek entry of the proposed judgment under the seven-day rule.” But even assuming that it applied, G’Sell filed his response to her motion for entry of the proposed judgment on the eighth day. As to the property division, the court held that it “was not rendered inequitable as a result of the court’s order that G’Sell be solely responsible for the tax consequences of his” decision to withdraw funds from a retirement fund. It also found no error in the ruling “that an arbitration award from the car accident was Grazier’s separate property.” Pickering was distinguishable. “Grazier testified that she deposited the proceeds from the arbitration award in a new account that she opened in her name, and there is no record evidence that the proceeds were used for marital expenses.” As to spousal support, while the court found no clear error in the trial court’s factual findings, it concluded that the “trial court abused its discretion by failing to make findings regarding G’Sell’s need for spousal support.” Additionally, it cited no authority (and the court found none) for the general proposition it stated “that neither party should be accountable to the other for income that they earn after they reached retirement age.” The court concluded that if “Grazier continues to receive income by working at a position that G’Sell’s contributions during the marriage helped make possible, G’Sell may be entitled to modifiable support from her employment income if he needs support, if she has the ability to pay support, and if an order of spousal support would be equitable.” It was unable to determine, absent findings about “his need and about the income-generating potential of his" property award, whether denying him spousal support “was equitable under the circumstances.” The failure to make these findings also precluded meaningful review of the denial of his request for attorney fees. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.