Criminal contempt related to a divorce case; MCR 3.606(A); People v MacLean; A trial court’s inherent & statutory authority to enforce its orders; In re Moroun; Corporate intent; Green v Ziegelman; Principle a corporation is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of its employees; Upjohn Co v New Hampshire Ins Co; Supporting affidavit requirements in criminal contempt cases; MCR 2.119(B)(1); Challenge to a subpoena; MCR 2.506(H); Witness fees; MCR 2.506(G)(1); Chase v Kalamazoo Circuit Judge; In re Petition of Labor Mediation Bd; Distinguishing Castillon v Roy; Punishment for criminal contempt; MCL 600.1715(1); Due process; Ripeness

Holding that the trial court erred by finding defendant-ex-husband’s (David) brother’s (defendant-Howard) company, defendant-Fraser Equities (Fraser), was in contempt, but did not err by finding Howard and his company defendant-Alliance Equities (Alliance) were in contempt, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff-ex-wife (Lynn) sought to recover funds David transferred to Howard and Howard’s companies in contemplation of Lynn and David’s divorce. The trial court ruled in Lynn’s favor. On appeal, the court agreed with Fraser that the trial court erred by holding it in criminal contempt. It noted that, given the trial court expressly found that Fraser’s sole agent, Howard, did not possess the intent to violate an injunction, the trial court erred by finding Fraser willfully violated the injunction. “It is not rational to impute a different intent to Fraser in light of the [trial] court’s finding that Howard, Fraser’s sole agent, lacked criminal intent.” However, the court rejected Howard’s and Alliance’s argument that they were not in contempt. First, it rejected their argument that the trial court erred by proceeding with a show-cause hearing because Lynn’s motion to show cause was defective due to the accompanying affidavit. “[B]ecause Lynn’s lawyer affidavit establishes that he had personal knowledge regarding how he obtained the business record and had personal knowledge about the contents of the business record, the affidavit” was not defective. Next, it rejected their claim that the trial court erred by quashing their subpoena to have Lynn’s lawyer testify at the show-cause hearing. “Lynn’s lawyer’s limited knowledge would have been of no assistance in resolving any pertinent factual disputes.” In addition, Howard and Alliance “failed to show how, if they were precluded from presenting a defense, the error was outcome-determinative.” The court further rejected Howard’s contention the trial court’s finding that he was the person who withdrew funds on behalf of Alliance was not supported by the admissible evidence. “[W]ith Howard being Alliance’s sole member and manager, and there being no evidence of anyone else acting on behalf of Alliance, the trial court” did not err by finding he was the person who initiated and effectuated the withdrawal. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not err in its other factual findings, that Howard and Alliance abandoned any challenge to the imposition of restitution, and that their argument as to punishment for criminal contempt was not ripe for review.