The 180-day rule (MCL 780.131); People v Hendershot; People v Lown; MCL 780.133; Delay due to the Supreme Court’s decision to suspend jury trials because of the COVID pandemic; People v Schinzel

The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the charges against defendant for violation of the 180-day rule where “a significant amount of the delay in bringing” the case to trial was not the prosecution’s fault but rather was due to the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision to suspend jury trials early in the COVID pandemic. Thus, the court reversed the order dismissing the charges and remanded. The Supreme Court concluded in Hendershot that “the Legislature did not intend to require that a trial necessarily take place within 180 days. . . . Rather, if ‘apparent good-faith action is taken well within the period and the people proceed promptly and with dispatch thereafter toward readying the case for trial, the condition of the statute for the court’s retention of jurisdiction is met.’” Further, it explained in Lown that “the rule does not require that a trial be commenced or completed within 180 days of the date notice was delivered. . . . it is sufficient that the prosecutor proceed promptly and move the case to the point of readiness for trial within the 180-day period.” In this case, the pretrial hearing was adjourned several days because the prosecution failed to “file a writ for defendant’s appearance from prison. It was not until several days after the 180-day period had expired that” the prosecution responded to his discovery request. However, the prosecution “does not necessarily violate the 180-day rule solely because more diligence could have been employed.” Nothing in the record indicated the prosecution initially delayed proceedings “in a bad-faith attempt to delay trial.” It was significant that much of the delay in the scheduled jury trial resulted from the suspension of jury trials during the pandemic. The court found the delay here “somewhat analogous” to the one in Schinzel, which “was caused by a wholesale change in docketing systems approved by” the Supreme Court. The court held there “that the delay was excusable under the 180-day rule.” While that decision was not binding because it was issued before 11/1/90, the court found its analysis persuasive. Further, the record showed the prosecution “took necessary steps to get this case ready for trial within a practicable time-frame given the circumstances.”