Sentencing; Motion for a sentence reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act; Procedural reasonableness; Substantive reasonableness; 18 USC § 3553(a)

The court held that defendant-Johnson’s 300-month sentence was substantively unreasonable where the district court gave “undue weight” to two of the sentencing factors — (1) the nature of the offense and his criminal history and characteristics, and (2) the need for the sentence to deter future criminal conduct and protect the public. Thus, it reversed the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, vacated his sentence, and remanded. A jury convicted Johnson of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, FIP, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The district court sentenced him as a career offender to 360 months. This was later reduced to 300 months after remand for resentencing. In denying his subsequent motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, the district court found that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against him. The court first held that Johnson’s sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court followed the proper procedure and properly calculated his corrected guidelines range. But the court held that his sentence was substantively unreasonable, focusing on its length and concluding that it was “greater than necessary . . . .” It concluded that the district court “unduly weighed factor (a)(1), the nature of the offense and Johnson’s criminal history and characteristics, and factor (a)(2), the need for the sentence to deter future criminal conduct and protect the public from future crimes of the defendant.” The court agreed with Johnson that “‘the district court failed to adequately explain why a nearly ten-year upward variance [from the upper end of the applicable guidelines range] is necessary to protect the public.’” It noted that his risk of reoffending was already factored into the guidelines range. The court also held that the district court gave “too little weight to another § 3553(a) factor, namely, ‘the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.’” It noted that the facts surrounding Johnson’s conviction placed “him within the landscape of ‘typical’ defendants whose sentences have nevertheless been reduced pursuant to the First Step Act.”