Negligence; Duty; Hill v Sears, Roebuck & Co; Due care; Clark v Dalman; Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); Dalley v Dykema Gossett; Negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED); Liability protection afforded to funeral establishments under MCL 700.3209(3); A surviving spouse’s statutory authority to make decisions as to the handling of the deceased spouse’s body; MCL 700.3206(1) & (3)(c)

The court held that defendant-funeral home owed plaintiff-surviving spouse (Wahl) a duty to accurately report when her husband’s autopsy was completed, and that discovery was needed to determine if a question of fact existed. It also found it was premature to rule on plaintiffs’ IIED claim, affirmed the denial of summary disposition for defendant as to the NIED claim, and concluded plaintiffs’ claims were not barred by MCL 700.3209(3). They alleged defendant breached its duties to determine the qualifications of the representative who performed the autopsy, supervise it, and ensure its success before proceeding with the cremation. The trial court denied defendant’s summary disposition motion. On appeal, the court found that although defendant did not owe some of the duties plaintiffs claimed it did, it did owe a duty to accurately report when the autopsy was completed, and that discovery was needed on this matter. Defendant’s “duties under the contract were only to provide a room in which the autopsy would occur, clean up afterward, return the body to cold storage, and later cremate the body” on Wahl’s approval. It “assumed no obligation relating to the performance of the autopsy itself.” However, a duty arose from its “contractual obligations to accurately inform Wahl when the autopsy had been completed. This is a limited duty commensurate with the parties’ limited contractual relationship.” Defendant could not have obtained her “approval to cremate the body without first informing her that the autopsy had been completed. [It] had a duty to use reasonable care in reaching that conclusion.” As such, discovery was needed to determine whether defendant misrepresented that the autopsy was completed, which caused Wahl to instruct it to go ahead with the cremation. Because the court remanded for discovery on the alleged misrepresentation, it was premature to decide to whether defendant was entitled to summary disposition of the IIED claim, but the court noted that mere negligence is not enough to sustain it. As defendant did not address the NIED claim, the court affirmed the denial of summary disposition as to this claim. As to MCL 700.3209(3), plaintiffs sought to hold defendant “liable for what its funeral director told Wahl before she instructed the director to proceed with the cremation.” The court noted that “while the statute grants immunity for a funeral establishment’s good-faith reliance on instructions regarding the decisions about the decedent’s body, it does not provide immunity for misrepresentations made by the funeral establishment.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.