Self-representation; Knowing & voluntary waiver of the right to counsel; The requirements of Farretta v California; Right to compulsory process & to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment; The district court’s refusal to review letters regarding defendant’s witness list; Other acts evidence; FRE 404(b); FRE 404(a)(2)(A); Sentencing; Procedural & substantive reasonableness; Determination that unlawful imprisonment under MCL 750.349b was analogous to USSG §2A4.1 for kidnapping, abduction, & unlawful restraint; United States v Epley; Whether the witness tampering counts should have been grouped together; USSG §3D1.2(a); Adequate application of the 18 USC § 3553(a) factors; Reassignment of the case on remand; Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] Joining other circuits and applying de novo review to the waiver of the right to counsel, the court held that defendant-Johnson was entitled to a new trial where the district court failed to hold a formal Faretta “colloquy to inform him ‘of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so’” the record could establish that his waiver was knowing and voluntary. A jury convicted him of unlawful imprisonment, assault of a domestic partner by strangulation and suffocation, interstate domestic violence, witness tampering, and assault. Before trial, he successfully requested that his appointed attorney no longer represent him, asserting ““overfamiliarization” with the AUSA. He also became angry with the second attorney, accusing him of colluding with the AUSA. The second attorney successfully moved to withdraw, and Johnson made an oral motion to proceed pro se. At a hearing, he again said he wanted to represent himself. After discussion, the district court issued an order stating that Johnson had “knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.” He was unable to call any witnesses at trial because he had not had them subpoenaed, even though he claimed to have sent a list to standby counsel and to the district court. At one point during trial, the district court refused his request to have standby counsel take over a cross-examination, but eventually let standby counsel take over the remainder of the trial and sentencing. The court noted that for a waiver of the right to counsel in the Sixth Circuit, “‘district courts must conduct a colloquy akin to that in section 1.02 of the Bench Book for United States District Judges.’” Concluding that the de novo standard of review is “appropriate for reviewing the district court’s Faretta inquiry,” the court held that “the district court should have held a formal colloquy . . . .” It found that the questions the district court asked Johnson about his wish to represent himself did “not reflect that the requirements of the Bench Book were met” and fell “far short” of the Faretta inquiries it had approved in other cases. Further, there was not sufficient evidence that he waived his right through his “conduct toward his attorneys.” The court also reversed on the basis that the district court violated his right to compulsory process and to present a defense. While it rejected his challenges to the admission of other acts evidence, it held that the district court erred by not adequately applying the § 3553(a) factors in sentencing him. It reversed his convictions and sentence, and remanded for a new trial before a different judge.