Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Hicks/Brown; A parent’s commensurate responsibility to participate in & benefit from the services offered; In re Frey; Effect of a parent’s incarceration; In re Mason; Parent agency treatment plan (PATP)

Holding that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts and that § (c)(i) was met, the court affirmed termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. Respondent’s and the children’s mother’s rights were terminated when they failed to participate in and benefit from services. In a prior appeal, the court vacated the trial court’s order assuming jurisdiction over the children and its order of adjudication, and remanded. The DHHS subsequently filed a new petition, alleging it was contrary to the children’s welfare to be in “respondent’s care and custody because of his ‘substantial criminal history, substance abuse, failure to participate and benefit from services and his current incarceration for an extended period of time.’” Although reunification was initially the goal, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition seeking termination. The trial court ultimately found that “more than 182 days had passed since the initial disposition,” that the conditions leading “to adjudication continued to exist and that there was no likelihood that they would be rectified within a reasonable time in light of the children’s ages.” In the present appeal, the court rejected his argument that “the DHHS did not make reasonable efforts at reunification in light of his incarceration, the COVID pandemic, and the lack of services that could feasibly be offered to him.” It found that the DHHS “made reasonable efforts to engage respondent in the PATP given the unique circumstances of this case, but there was no evidence that respondent availed himself of any accessible resources.” As to a statutory ground for termination, he contended that, under § (c)(i), the 182-day period needed to occur between the initial disposition and the statutory review and permanency planning hearing when the goal was changed to adoption and a petition was authorized to terminate. “Contrary to respondent’s assertion, 182 days must elapse between the initial disposition and termination, not when the goal is changed from adoption to termination.” The time here between the “initial disposition and the termination trial was 260 days, and the time between the initial disposition and the termination petition was 219 days.” As such, “more than 182 days had elapsed.”