Court costs; Constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii); Due process; People v Johnson; Tumey v Ohio; Dugan v Ohio; Ward v Village of Monroeville, OH; Separation-of-powers doctrine; Const 1963, art 3, § 2; People v Cameron

Holding that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is not unconstitutional because it does not violate criminal defendants’ due-process rights or the separation-of-powers doctrine, the court affirmed. Defendant pled guilty to unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle causing injury and felony-firearm. She was “sentenced to prison terms and ordered to pay $1,300 in court costs under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii).” She challenged only the constitutionality of the court costs, arguing that “the statute is unconstitutional because it undermines criminal defendants’ due-process right to appear before a neutral judge.” She claimed that “MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) creates ‘dual roles’ for trial judges that are incompatible and similar to the due-process violations in Tumey and Ward.” However, the facts here were “most similar to those in Dugan because the statute ‘do[es] not indicate where the money flows after the costs have been imposed on and paid by a convicted defendant,’ and does not order any portion of the money collected from criminal defendants to go directly to judges.” The court found that there “is no due-process concern, and no evidence that judges are pressured to impose certain costs, when judges do not have discretion over the costs they are imposing.” Defendant argued that “trial court judges’ financial interest in ‘keeping trial courts open and running’ is sufficient to show that the statute is unconstitutional as a violation of due process.” But, like the defendant in Johnson, she failed “to show the ‘direct nexus between a judge’s compensation and any fees or costs imposed that was present in Tumey.’” Her separation of powers argument also failed. Because she did not “establish the nexus needed in showing how a judge will benefit, she has not shown that trial court judges have a ‘direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest’ as a result of the statute.” She could not “prove that every trial court judge should be disqualified because of the statute. . . .”