Discovery sanction of dismissal; Vicencio v Ramirez; Failure to comply with a court order; MCR 2.504(B)(1); Inherent authority to sanction litigants & their counsel; Swain v Morse; Requirement that a plaintiff claiming no-fault benefits provide certain initial disclosures to the other parties; MCR 2.302(A)(2)(b), (3), & (5); MCR 2.313(C)(1); MCR 2.313(B)(2)(a)-(c); Uninsured & underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits

Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff’s claims as a discovery sanction, and that it was also correct in dismissing her claims under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because she did not provide any supporting evidence for them, the court affirmed. The case arose from an alleged auto accident involving a vehicle driven by defendant-Al-Qassab in which plaintiff was a passenger. She sued defendant-State Farm for PIP benefits and for UM/UIM benefits. She also sued defendant-LM General Insurance (Liberty Mutual) “for UM/UIM benefits and Al-Qassab for third-party economic damages in excess of the no-fault threshold.” On appeal, she suggested “the trial court lacked authority to sanction her because she did not violate a court order.” The court disagreed, first noting she “failed to establish that she complied with the scheduling order.” In addition, even if she “had not violated a court order, the trial court still had authority to dismiss plaintiff’s claims as a discovery sanction[,]” and the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in exercising that authority. While “the trial court did not verbatim recite” the relevant factors or discuss other possible sanctions, its “reasoning implies it considered both. Perhaps weighing most heavily in the trial court’s calculus was plaintiff’s history of deliberate delay.” It also noted that the prior dismissal without prejudice due to her failure to cooperate with discovery “had not worked to remedy plaintiff’s recalcitrant conduct, implying that a sanction lesser than dismissal with prejudice would not be justified.” As to her contention that all the Vicencio factors weighed in her favor, the court found that few of her arguments were “factually accurate” and that even those with factual support were unavailing. Among other things, while she “did respond to some discovery requests, this does not mean the rest of plaintiff’s violations were inadvertent—especially considering that her answers were incomplete, evasive, and untimely.” And the fact she “eventually responded to some of State Farm’s and Liberty Mutual’s discovery requests and untimely provided her initial disclosures to all three defendants did nothing to cure any prejudice to them.” In addition, she presented no evidence she was entitled PIP or UM/UIM benefits or in support of her claim against Al-Qassab.