Motion for relief from judgment based on ineffective assistance of counsel; “Good cause”; Sufficient justification for imposing consecutive sentences; Actual prejudice

Concluding that trial counsel was ineffective and this established good cause for defendant’s motion for relief from judgment, the court vacated his sentences, reversed the order denying his motion for relief from judgment, and remanded. He pled guilty to possession of heroin with intent to deliver, second offense, resisting and obstructing a police officer, and fourth-degree fleeing and eluding. He was sentenced to 76 to 900 months for the possession conviction and 46 to 180 months each for the other two. The trial court ordered all three sentences be served consecutively. Defendant argued that “he had good cause for failing to challenge his sentences because his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective.” He also argued that “his sentences were invalid because the trial court failed to justify the consecutive feature of his sentences.” The court held that the trial court “made three errors” in sentencing him. First, it failed to order him “to serve his fleeing-and-eluding sentence first to permit other sentences to be consecutively stacked on that one. Second, [it] failed to identify the proper statutory authority that permitted resisting and obstructing a police officer to be a consecutive sentence. And, third, [it] failed to provide a sufficient explanation of why it imposed consecutive sentences instead of concurrent” ones. Further, there was “no strategic rationale for not objecting on the basis of those three errors.” While counsel argued “at sentencing that the trial court should not impose consecutive sentences, trial counsel did . . . not object when the trial court failed to identify the proper legal authority for the consecutive sentences or to provide a sufficient explanation for why” they were warranted. Thus, the court held that counsel’s performance was deficient. In addition, “defendant was clearly prejudiced by the trial court not specifying that his fleeing-and-eluding sentence had to be served first. Without that specification, the trial court could not stack any of the other sentences on the fleeing-and-eluding one.” The failure to identify statutory authority for imposing a consecutive sentence for the resisting and obstructing “conviction also prejudiced defendant because, without that statutory basis, this sentence could not be served consecutively.” And, as to the third error, he “was prejudiced because an appellate court would have been left without an adequate record to review the appropriateness of his sentences."