Divorce; Motion to modify parenting time; Vodvarka v Grasmeyer; Shade v Wright; Whether any error as to the applicable standard warranted relief; Child support; Retroactive modification; MCL 552.603(2); MCL 552.603b; Motion for attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D); Loutts v Loutts; Reed v Reed; Motion for sanctions under MCR 1.109(E); Whether a claim was “frivolous”

The court held that plaintiff-mother’s motion to modify parenting time was properly denied, but that there was no basis for retroactive modification of child support under MCL 552.603b. Rather, under MCL 552.603(2), the modification should be effective as of the date she received notice of defendant-father’s petition to modify support. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motions for attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D) and for sanctions under MCR 1.109(E), but did err in sanctioning her and awarding defendant attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D). As to parenting time, the court found it did not have to decide if the trial court correctly ruled that Vodvarka applied because, “regardless of whether the trial court should have applied Shade” here instead, the error would not warrant appellate relief. It held that the facts found by the trial court revealed “an ongoing pattern by plaintiff, before and after the entry of the divorce judgment, of manipulative and alienating behavior that was designed to harm defendant and his relationship with the children. Regardless of plaintiff’s assertions about her diagnosis, this pattern has not changed, and the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff’s conduct had ‘worsened’ since entry of the divorce judgment was not against the great weight of the evidence.” But the trial court’s findings as to child support modification did not support a retroactive modification. Its determination “that plaintiff’s conduct did not rise to the level of ‘fraud’ would seem to encompass the conclusion that plaintiff did not knowingly and intentionally fail to report income, refuse to report income, or knowingly misrepresent her income.” Thus, given its factual findings, MCL 552.603b did not apply. The court found that plaintiff fell “far short of showing facts sufficient to justify an award of attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D),” and as to her motion for sanctions, nothing in the record indicated “defendant filed documents not well-founded in facts or law or that he filed any documents for an improper purpose.” But as to his award of attorney fees, “the trial court clearly erred by concluding that plaintiff’s position was devoid of merit as to warrant sanctions.” Further, he did not show—and the trial court’s findings did not support—that he “incurred the attorney fees in question as a result of plaintiff’s violation of an order.” Affirmed in part and vacated in part.