Sentencing; Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Whether the mandatory lifetime sex offender registration requirement constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution; Distinguishing People v Dipiazza; Abandoned facial challenge; Whether the mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes cruel & unusual punishment under the U.S. Constitution; People v Hallak

The court held that requiring defendant to register as a sex offender and to submit to electronic monitoring for the rest of his life and was not cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution or cruel and unusual punishment under the U.S. Constitution. He was convicted of CSC II and accosting a child for an immoral purpose. He was sentenced to 48 to 180 months for each CSC II conviction and 24 to 48 months for accosting a child for an immoral purpose, all to be served concurrently, and ordered to submit to lifetime electronic monitoring. Defendant argued that “SORA’s mandatory lifetime sex offender registration requirement constitutes cruel or unusual punishment facially and as applied to him under” the Michigan Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. While he relied on Dipiazza, the facts of his case were very distinguishable. His “conduct was much more severe than the defendant’s in Dipiazza. First, and perhaps most importantly, defendant and his victim were not in a consensual relationship—defendant was the victim’s stepfather and she did not consent to any of the reported incidents. This created a power imbalance that was lacking in Dipiazza. Further, there was a significant age difference between defendant, who was a grown man in his thirties, and his victim, who was under the age of 13 at the time of each incident.” Thus, he was “not eligible for adjudication under HYTA or other similar diversion programs that avoid criminal convictions.” Considering the gravity of his offense, the court did “not think mandatory lifetime registration is a disproportionately harsh punishment in defendant’s case.” It concluded that “SORA’s unique lifetime registration requirement is not without justification.” Also, it determined that “SORA’s registration requirement is not materially different from sex offender registries in other states.” Additionally, the court found that “SORA’s lifetime registration requirement is not unjustifiably disproportionate as applied to the grave facts of” his offense. It further held that “SORA’s lifetime registration requirement is not invalid facially or as applied under the Michigan Constitution. Because the requirement is not cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution’s broader protection, it also is not cruel and unusual punishment under the U.S. Constitution’s narrower protection.” Affirmed.