Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); In re Williams; Reasonable time; In re Dahms; Principle that incarceration cannot be the sole basis for termination; In re Baham; Best interests of the children; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts Minors

Holding that § (c)(i) was met, and that termination was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. His rights were terminated based primarily on his incarceration and corresponding inability to provide care for the child. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the DHHS failed to prove a statutory ground for termination. “Multiple witnesses testified that they supported termination of [his] parental rights because [the child] needed permanence and stability.” In addition, it was “undisputed that more than 182 days elapsed between the initial dispositional order and the termination trial,” as required under § (c)(i). Further, the fact that he “may have attempted to provide for [the child’s] care does not change that he failed to do so.” The court also rejected his claim that termination was not in the child’s best interests. The child “did not have a strong bond with” respondent, and the child’s foster mother was not certain whether the child even understood that respondent was his biological father. “This problem was exacerbated by the fact that respondent” contacted the child only three times during the pendency of this case. “DHHS was unable to assess [his] parenting ability because of his incarceration, but even respondent . . . acknowledged that the foster parents had done an excellent job caring for” the child, who was very close with his foster family “and referred to his foster parents as mom and dad.” Finally, the caseworker and the child’s therapist each testified that termination was in the child’s best interests “because he needed permanence and finality, and the foster parents, who had been caring for” him for most of his life, were willing to adopt him.