Motion for change of legal & physical custody; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Proper cause or a change of circumstances; Dailey v Kloenhamer; Pierron v Pierron; The statutory best-interest factors (MCL 722.23); Consideration of joint custody; MCL 722.26a(1); Fisher v Fisher; Judicial bias; Raise or waive rule

The court held that the trial court’s findings as to the statutory best-interest factors were not contrary to the great weight of the evidence and it did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff-father sole legal custody of the parties’ child. The parties had joint legal and physical custody of the child before plaintiff moved to change both. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court awarded him sole legal custody but left “the joint physical custody arrangement in place.” The court first noted that defendant-mother was mistaken that the principles set forth in Dailey did not apply “simply because the fact-specific disagreements and conflicts at issue in Dailey were not identical to those in this case. Here, there was evidence supporting the trial court’s findings that there had been an escalation of disagreements and conflicts and an increase in the lack of cooperation, which were largely being driven by defendant.” It further concluded that the trial court did not err in determining that best-interest factors (b), (g), (h), and (l) weighed in plaintiff’s favor, and that (k) did not apply. The trial court based its finding as to (h) on defendant’s failure to “share the child’s Chromebook or Zoom class times with plaintiff,” among other things. While she asserted “she gave plaintiff ample opportunity to obtain the Chromebook, the trial court was referring to the ‘initial issues’ regarding defendant’s unwillingness to share the Chromebook. And defendant does not challenge plaintiff’s testimony that she failed to share the Zoom schedule with” him. While she contended that (k) “should have favored her on the basis that plaintiff filed ‘nonstop custody motions, requested jail time and contempt,’ and ‘abuse[d] [her] through judicial harassment[,]’” the court noted that these actions did “not constitute ‘domestic violence.’” As to (l), it held that “the trial court’s reliance on the past contempt findings alone” supported its ruling. Finally, it found that defendant failed to preserve her judicial bias claim, and that it had no merit in any event. Affirmed.