Right to an impartial jury; Excusing jurors for cause; MCR 2.511(D); Exclusion of expert testimony in a child sexual abuse case; People v Peterson; People v Thorpe; Rights to present a complete defense & to confrontation; Exclusion of evidence about the victim’s prior abuse allegations; The rape shield statute (MCL 750.520j); People v Williams; Judicial misconduct; People v Stevens
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to excuse two potential jurors for cause, and that while it erred in excluding certain expert testimony, the error was harmless. Further, because he did not present “any concrete evidence” that the victim made prior false sexual abuse accusations, he failed to show that relevant evidence was excluded in violation of his rights to present a defense and to confrontation. Finally, the court rejected his judicial misconduct claim. Thus, it affirmed his convictions of CSC I, CSC II, and accosting a minor for immoral purposes. He asserted that potential juror SK should have been excused for cause (defense counsel used a peremptory challenge to remove her) “because she stated unequivocally that she could not be fair to defendant.” But the court concluded that her statements did not constitute “declarations that SK could not set aside her views.” Instead, they revealed her “hesitancy about the ‘subject matter.’” Thus, it found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that SK’s ambivalence did not show “she was biased against defendant, or that she had firmly made up her mind about the case on the basis of her personal experience. SK’s statements that it would be ‘difficult’ stopped short of stating that she would not judge fairly,” and the court deferred “‘to the trial court’s superior ability to assess from a venireman’s demeanor whether the person would be impartial.’” As to the denial of the motion to exclude juror DE, while he “expressed concern about his impartiality, he ultimately stated that he would be able to evaluate the evidence without prejudice and according to the law.” The court noted that jurors are presumed impartial until shown otherwise, and defendant had the burden to establish DE was not impartial or that there was reasonable doubt whether he was so. The trial court found that DE could fairly judge the evidence, and the court again deferred to its assessment. The court held that defense counsel’s question to an expert “‘but it’s also true that kids do fabricate, correct?’ was a proper question that did not violate Thorpe.” But the trial court’s ruling precluding it was harmless where there was extensive testimony about “the victim’s credibility and her motivation to fabricate the allegations” and defendant offered other evidence that she “was not being truthful about” them.
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